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Superstar Judges as Entrepreneurs: 
The Untold Story of 
Fraud-on-the-Market 
Margaret V. Sachs* 
This Article unites two disparate subjects of profound interest to legal 
scholars. One is fraud-on-the-market, reaffirmed late last term in Erica P. 
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton II). Probably the most 
important claim in the securities litigation universe, fraud-on-the-market is 
the sine qua non of almost every securities class action that is filed. The 
other subject consists of the judicial opinions of Judges Frank Easterbrook 
and Richard Posner, the “superstars” of the current federal appellate bench. 
My purpose is several-fold: first, to show that fraud-on-the-market’s 
evolution, up through and culminating in Halliburton II, has been driven 
in significant measure by an unheralded series of contributions by Judge 
Easterbrook, Judge Posner, or a combination; and second, to reveal, by the 
use in part of an empirical spotlight, the strategies that they employed to 
bring their contributions to life. 
Judges Easterbrook and Posner influenced fraud-on-the-market by 
dominating the development of Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Nagy for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this Article. 
  
1208 University of California, Davis [Vol. 48:1207 
Procedure. Effective beginning more than ten years after Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, Rule 23(f) facilitates permissive appeals of certification orders, 
where fraud-on-the-market issues tend to arise. 
Their domination of Rule 23(f)’s development has had three dimensions. 
First, Judge Posner played a role in prompting the Rule’s adoption. Second, 
he or Judge Easterbrook authored the Seventh Circuit’s first seventeen 
reported Rule 23(f) opinions. Those opinions, which urged active use of 
the Rule in general and expressed antipathy towards fraud-on-the-market 
in particular, helped to fuel a series of rulings in other circuits that were 
hostile to fraud-on-the-market. Third, Judge Easterbrook thereafter wrote 
a Rule 23(f) opinion supportive of fraud-on-the-market, which influenced 
the Supreme Court’s approach in Halliburton II and elsewhere. 
Judges Easterbrook and Posner advanced their views by employing 
various strategies, including occasionally depicting precedent with less 
than complete accuracy. Other strategies seemed aimed at maximizing 
their opportunities to write Rule 23(f) opinions in the first place. Indeed, 
when serving as the presiding judge of their respective panels, they 
assigned Rule 23(f) opinions only to themselves or each other. Moreover, 
they had a greater number of such opinions to assign than would 
otherwise have been the case because the panels over which they presided 
tended to follow a peculiar practice upon granting permission to appeal a 
certification order, namely, retaining the appeal for decision rather than 
surrendering it for reassignment. There is cause at least to wonder 
whether, by so doing, they assumed more authority over important 
questions of class action law than any two jurists ought to have had. 
Two perspectives have to date inhibited the exploration of the 
superstars’ entrepreneurship. One holds that essentially all judicial 
activity tends to be all strategy, all the time. This perspective fails to 
appreciate the singular role played by the superstar judges in the 
formulation of the legal canon and the consequent importance of focusing 
on their operations. The other perspective regards entrepreneurship as 
noteworthy only to the extent that it occurs at the Supreme Court. This 
view ignores the fact that the superstar judges approach Supreme Court 
Justices in terms of the degree of influence that they wield. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The best judges . . . have wanted to change the law and have 
succeeded in doing so. — Richard A. Posner1 
Within the ranks of sitting federal circuit judges, Frank Easterbrook 
and Richard Posner stand out as the “superstars” in multiple respects.2 
One is the frequency with which their opinions are cited by courts 
outside their circuit.3 Another is how often law school casebooks 
feature their opinions as principal cases.4 Several scholars have 
hypothesized that these achievements reflect not only “merit” but also 
an inclination towards entrepreneurship,5 that is, a proneness to 
market their ideas and to seize opportunities for doing so.6 
Inspired by this hypothesis, I have written this Article with two 
purposes in mind. The first is to demonstrate the ways in which 
Judges Easterbrook and Posner have driven the evolution of fraud-on-
the-market7 in the period following its endorsement in Basic Inc. v. 
 
 1 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 127 (1990). 
 2 Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati have coined the “superstar” phraseology to denote 
the leading sitting federal appeals court judges — notably, Seventh Circuit Judges 
Easterbrook and Posner. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme 
Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 50 (2004) 
[hereinafter An Empirical Ranking]. Their counterparts in previous generations include the 
late Second Circuit Judges Henry J. Friendly and Learned Hand. Mitu Gulati & Veronica 
Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the Superstar Hypothesis with Judicial 
Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141, 1179 (2002). 
 3 See Choi & Gulati, An Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 50 (noting that 
Judges Easterbrook and Posner each outstripped the sample mean by more than four 
standard deviations in a study of citations spanning a two-year period). Citations 
outside a judge’s home circuit encompassed those from other circuits, from state 
courts, and from the Supreme Court. See id. 
 4 See Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1166.  
 5 For the seminal work on entrepreneurial judging, written by political scientists, 
see WAYNE V. MCINTOSH & CYNTHIA L. CATES, JUDICIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE ROLE OF 
THE JUDGE IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS (1997). 
 6 Frank Cross and Stefanie Lindquist have speculated that high citation rates may 
reflect a tendency towards entrepreneurship. See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, 
Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1419-22 (2009). They have cautioned, however, 
that their hypothesis is “purely theoretical.” Id. at 1425. Similarly, Mitu Gulati and 
Veronica Sanchez have attributed the success of Judge Posner in the “casebook 
market,” and by implication that of Judge Easterbrook as well, to their efforts at 
targeting an academic audience. See Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1180-81. 
 7 For illustrative commentary, see Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of 
Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. 
REV. 435 (1984); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of 
Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, The Fraud-on-the-Market Tort, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1755 (2013); Donald C. 
  
1212 University of California, Davis [Vol. 48:1207 
Levinson8 up through and including its reaffirmation last term in 
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II).9 Legal 
scholars have thus far altogether overlooked their efforts in this 
regard.10 
The other purpose is to identify, by the use in part of an empirical 
spotlight, the strategies that they employed to advance their views. By 
so doing, I hope to elicit scholarly interest in the superstars’ 
entrepreneurial behavior. This largely unexplored area of inquiry has 
the potential greatly to enhance our understanding about how legal 
doctrine evolves. 
Two different perspectives have together inhibited the examination 
of the superstars’ entrepreneurship. One, coming from the direction of 
political science, holds that essentially all judicial activity amounts to 
all strategy, all the time.11 This view fails to appreciate the singular 
role of the superstars as architects of the legal canon and the 
consequent importance of studying their strategies in particular. The 
other perspective, common among legal scholars, is to regard 
entrepreneurship as noteworthy only to the extent that it occurs on 
the Supreme Court.12 This view ignores the fact that the superstar 
 
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151 
[hereinafter Basic at Twenty]; Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-
Market: Reflections on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37 
(2015); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory 
Revisited, 77 VA. L. REV. 1001 (1991). 
 8 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 9 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408-13 (2014). 
 10 For legal commentators who have acknowledged Easterbrook and Posner’s pre-
Basic support for fraud-on-the-market, see Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1179-
80 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 
15.8 (3d ed. 1986); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control 
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 708 n.28 (1982). See generally Langevoort, Basic at 
Twenty, supra note 7, at 164-65, 178-81, 188-89 (discussing the early efforts of 
Easterbrook, as both scholar and jurist, to premise fraud-on-the-market on the 
efficient market hypothesis).  
 11 See Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 514 (1998) 
(reviewing LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)) 
(describing the authors, political scientists, as urging the view that “strategy explains 
everything” on the Supreme Court). 
 12 This viewpoint can be inferred from the existence of numerous articles by legal 
scholars on the strategies employed by Supreme Court Justices and the absence of 
such articles on the strategies of circuit court judges. For illustrative articles about the 
former, see Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Strategy in Supreme 
Court Case Selection: The Relationship Between Certiorari and the Merits, 69 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1, 1-3 (2008); Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 TENN. 
L. REV. 763, 764-69 (2013); Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraints on Supreme 
Court Opinion Assignment, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1729-30 (2006). See also E. 
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judges approach Supreme Court Justices in terms of the degree of 
influence that the judges wield.13 
Judges Easterbrook and Posner succeeded in influencing fraud-on-
the-market’s evolution by dominating the development of Rule 23(f) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). Effective at the end 
of 1998, more than ten years after Basic,14 Rule 23(f) offers a 
mechanism for appealing certification orders that omits the 
restrictions that have hobbled the older, alternative mechanism set 
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) — namely, the need for the trial court to 
agree to an appeal as well as to find a controlling question of law as to 
which there is a substantial ground for a difference of opinion.15 
Their domination in this regard has consisted of three dimensions. 
First, Judge Posner played a role in prompting Rule 23(f)’s adoption.16 
Second, he or Judge Easterbrook authored each of the Seventh 
Circuit’s first seventeen reported Rule 23(f) opinions.17 Those opinions 
advocated active use of Rule 23(f) in general and also expressed 
antagonism towards fraud-on-the-market in particular,18 fueling the 
hostile stances to that claim adopted by other circuits pursuant to Rule 
23(f).19 Thereafter, Judge Easterbrook changed direction with a Rule 
 
Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The 
Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1627 (2004) 
(invoking the entrepreneurship of the late Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to explain the 
large number of antitrust and securities cases heard by the Supreme Court during his 
tenure). Conversely, the principal work on strategies at the circuit level is 
unpublished. See Jeffrey A. Berger & Tracey E. George, Judicial Entrepreneurs on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals: A Citation Analysis of Judicial Influence 7-8, 19-20 (Vanderbilt 
Univ. Law Sch., Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 05-24, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=789544. 
 13 Cf. Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1143 (depicting the legal canon as 
comprised of opinions authored by Supreme Court Justices, the superstars, and the 
superstars’ counterparts from previous generations). For the identification of these 
counterparts, see Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1179. 
 14 The decision date for Basic Inc. v. Levinson was March 7, 1988. See Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Rule 23(f) became effective on December 1, 1998. See 
Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and 
Appellate Procedure, 177 F.R.D. 530 (U.S. 1998) (setting effective date of December 1, 
1998 and transferring Rule 23(f) and other amendments from the Supreme Court to 
Congress under the Rules Enabling Act). 
 15 See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. For an acknowledgement that 
these obstacles were deliberately omitted from Rule 23(f), see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) 
advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment. 
 16 See infra notes 120–47 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 169–77 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 196–232 and accompanying text. 
 19 For illustrative decisions, see infra notes 234–36 and accompanying text. 
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23(f) opinion that embraced fraud-on-the-market.20 That opinion 
shaped the approach to fraud-on-the-market taken by the Supreme 
Court in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I),21 
Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds,22 and 
Halliburton II.23 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I sets the stage. After 
examining the crucial role played by fraud-on-the-market in class 
actions brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
193424 and Rule 10b-5,25 it turns to why the questions left unanswered 
by Basic26 did not quickly become lower court grist. One reason 
involved a strained interpretation of a 1974 Supreme Court decision 
that was not put to rest until after the turn of the twenty-first 
century.27 The other involved the limited opportunities for obtaining 
appellate review of certification orders28 prior to the addition of Rule 
23(f) to Rule 23.29 
Part II examines how Judge Posner promoted the addition of Rule 
23(f) through the auspices of his 1995 opinion in In re Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer, Inc.30 That opinion served as a scarcely concealed memorandum 
to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which must approve any 
proposed amendment to the FRCP before it can become law.31 To 
 
 20 See Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 2010). This is discussed 
infra Part IV. 
 21 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 22 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
 23 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 24 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 25 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
 26 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 27 The Supreme Court decision in question was Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 
U.S. 156 (1974). For a discussion of the strained interpretation of Eisen, which was 
rejected as a formal matter in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 
(2011), see infra notes 100–05 and accompanying text. Ten years before the Dukes 
decision, Judge Easterbrook dealt the strained interpretation a substantial blow in 
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001), discussed infra notes 
186–95 and accompanying text. 
 28 These orders are interlocutory. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 
463, 470-77 (1978). 
 29 For the text of Rule 23(f), see infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 30 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 31 See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1001 n.18 
(3d ed. 2005). Approval must come not only from the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, but also thereafter from the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and Congress. See id.; see also 
Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103-04 (2002). 
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make his case for Rule 23(f), as well as for another amendment to Rule 
23,32 Judge Posner depicted two lines of precedent with less than 
complete accuracy.33 
Part III focuses on the authorship by Judges Easterbrook and Posner 
of the Seventh Circuit’s first seventeen Rule 23(f) reported opinions.34 
Part III explains how they cornered the market in this respect. A 
portion of the explanation derives from the fact that opinions are 
assigned by the panel’s presiding judge, a position determined by 
seniority.35 Judge Easterbrook or Judge Posner presided over sixteen of 
the seventeen panels and in that capacity assigned the Rule 23(f) 
opinions only to themselves or each other.36 But how did it happen 
that one or the other of them was a member of all seventeen panels in 
the first place? The answer involves the nature of the panels: eleven of 
the seventeen were motions panels that granted permission to appeal 
and then retained the appeal for decision. If the motion panels had 
instead surrendered the appeals for reassignment to merit panels, 
some percentage of those merit panels would likely not have included 
Judge Easterbrook or Judge Posner. In this event, Judges Easterbrook 
and Posner would have written fewer Rule 23(f) opinions, since a 
judge cannot write an opinion on behalf of a panel on which he does 
not serve.37 
Part III then turns to the initial Rule 23(f) opinions that carried 
significance for fraud-on-the-market’s evolution. These opinions 
included two by Judge Easterbrook, one with Judge Posner on the 
panel,38 that not only denigrated Basic but also depicted a crisis 
involving in terrorem securities class action settlements without 
acknowledging the existence of the two statutes that had been enacted 
to address that crisis39 — the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 (“PSLRA”)40 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
 
 32 See infra notes 148–58 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 140–42, 148–52 and accompanying text. 
 34 For a list of the seventeen opinions, see infra note 161. 
 35 See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 36 For a table capturing the opinions, the presiding judges, and the opinion 
writers, see infra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 37 See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2012). 
 38 The two were Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing securities issues in the context of a case not involving securities law) and 
West v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 282 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing securities 
issues in the context of a fraud-on-the-market case). The opinion in Blair was written 
with Judge Posner on the panel. See Blair, 181 F.3d at 833. 
 39 See infra notes 196–215, 217–32 and accompanying text. 
 40 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
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Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”).41 These opinions in all likelihood played a 
role in fueling the imposition by other circuits of substantial new 
burdens on plaintiffs seeking certification in fraud-on-the-market 
cases.42 
Part IV examines Judge Easterbrook’s subsequent Rule 23(f) opinion 
in Schleicher v. Wendt,43 which sent fraud-on-the-market off in a new 
direction.44 Sparing the plaintiffs the burdens that the defendants 
sought to impose on them, Judge Easterbrook saluted Basic, celebrated 
the PSLRA and the SLUSA as Congress’s solution to in terrorem 
settlements, and called upon the courts to refrain, on separation-of-
powers grounds, from creating their own solutions to the in terrorem 
securities class action settlement phenomenon.45 After considering 
various explanations for the shift,46 Part IV concludes by examining 
the impact of Schleicher on the Supreme Court’s three most recent 
engagements with fraud-on-the-market47 — Halliburton I,48 Amgen,49 
and Halliburton II.50 
Part V takes a closer look at strategies that Judges Easterbrook and 
Posner employed to accentuate their influence. The most startling 
involves their occasional less than fully accurate portrayals of 
precedent,51 which, it appears, may not be one-off events. A Westlaw 
search indicates that since 1982,52 the Seventh Circuit has issued fifty-
seven reported signed majority opinions charged by a dissent or 
concurrence with misstating precedent.53 Judge Easterbrook or Judge 
Posner wrote twenty-nine of these opinions, with the remaining 
 
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 41 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 
Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78, 80). 
 42 See infra notes 233–38 and accompanying text. 
 43 618 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2010), discussed infra notes 243–72. 
 44 See infra notes 273–306 and accompanying text.  
 45 See infra notes 243–57 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 265–72 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 273–306 and accompanying text. 
 48 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 49 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
 50 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 51 See infra notes 141–42, 148–50, 205–07, 214–16, 227–29, 231, 232 and 
accompanying text. 
 52 The year 1982 was selected as the start point because Judge Posner took the oath 
of office on December 4, 1981. See Chronology of Judges in the Seventh Circuit, LIBRARY OF 
THE U.S. COURTS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.lb7.uscourts. 
gov/JUDGES%20CHRONOLOGY%2004.07.14%20w-o%20political%20affiliations.pdf 
[hereinafter Seventh Circuit Chronology]. 
 53 See infra note 315 and accompanying text. 
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twenty-eight authored by all the other Seventh Circuit judges 
combined.54 
Likewise intriguing were the panels presided over by Judges 
Easterbrook or Posner that granted petitions to appeal and then 
retained the appeals for decision rather than surrendering them for 
reassignment.55 To be sure, the Easterbrook or Posner opinions 
written in these instances typically offered an efficiency rationale for 
reaching the merits — the appeal could be resolved quickly based on 
the comprehensive briefs filed in connection with the petition.56 While 
plausible as far as it goes, this rationale fails to take into account the 
arguable appearance of impropriety that arises from the retention. 
Indeed, when deciding to grant a petition, the motions panel may 
develop a view concerning how the appeal should be resolved. 
Retaining the appeal for decision puts the motions panel in the 
position of being able to turn their ideal resolution into an actuality.57 
Yet another noteworthy strategy involved Judges Easterbrook and 
Posner’s cornering the market on the authorship of the first seventeen 
Rule 23(f) opinions in their circuit.58 What they did violates no 
statutory norm, but it raises the question, on which I remain agnostic, 
as to whether they acquired greater influence over the evolution of 
Rule 23(f), as well as major questions of class action law, than any two 
judges should have had. Recently, some scholars have argued in favor 
of specialization by circuit judges on efficiency grounds when the 
subject area presents the complexity of, say, tax or antitrust.59 But 
Rule 23(f), a single, circumscribed procedural rule that any competent 
judge should be able to interpret and apply, cannot readily be 
analogized to these fields. 
I. BASIC INC. V. LEVINSON AND THE INITIAL FAILURE OF LOWER COURT 
ENGAGEMENT 
This Part lays the foundation for the Parts to follow. It begins with 
why Rule 10b-5’s reliance element makes class certification difficult 
 
 54 See id. 
 55 See infra notes 178–80, 319–20 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra note 321 and accompanying text. 
 57 Cf. Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class 
Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the U.S. Courts of Appeals Under Rule 
23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1589 n.294 (2000) (discussing the strategic 
aspects of retaining an appeal for decision after granting permission to appeal under 
Rule 23(f)). 
 58 See infra notes 169–77 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra note 328 and accompanying text. 
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and then turns to the solutions that courts have generated in response. 
The most comprehensive such solution came from the Supreme 
Court’s watershed decision in Basic.60 But the lower courts did not 
fully engage with the questions that Basic left unanswered until the 
twenty-first century was well under way. 
A. The Traditional Rule 10b-5 Claim and Its Lack of Amenability to 
Class Certification 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 operate as the leading anti-fraud 
weapon in the federal securities laws, applicable regardless of the size 
of the issuer.61 As originally contemplated by their drafters, these 
provisions were enforceable only by the Securities & Exchange 
Commission and the Department of Justice.62 Beginning in 1946, 
however, courts recognized an implied private action under the statute 
and Rule that is now established “beyond peradventure.”63 The 
elements of that action, drawn from an amalgam of statutory text, 
legislative history, policy considerations, and tort law,64 include a 
“material” misrepresentation or omission with a “connection” to the 
purchase or sale of the security, a causative link between the 
misrepresentation or omission and each plaintiff’s investment decision 
(“reliance”), a causative link between the misrepresentation or 
omission and the loss for which damages are sought (“loss 
causation”), and scienter.65 
In the case of a class action, the court must determine whether the 
plaintiffs have met the certification requirements of Rule 23 of the 
 
 60 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 61 See DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES 
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 23 (3d ed. 2011). 
 62 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-30 (1975) (“Section 
10(b) of the 1934 Act does not by its terms provide an express civil remedy for its 
violation. Nor does the history of this provision provide any indication that Congress 
considered the problem of private suits under it at the time of its passage.”); see also id. at 
737 (noting that “[w]hen we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a 
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn”). 
 63 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983); see also Janus 
Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011) (describing 
the private action as “settled”). 
 64 See NAGY, PAINTER & SACHS, supra note 61, at 24-26 (discussing the amalgam of 
considerations that courts bring to bear in interpreting Rule 10b-5).  
 65 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (listing the 
elements); see also Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317-18 
(2011) (same). 
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FRCP.66 The court’s certification decision is typically make-or-break 
for everyone involved. If certification is denied, the members of the 
might-have-been class may lose the opportunity to recover because 
they lack the resources to sue individually.67 On the other hand, if 
certification is granted, the defendants may be driven to settle rather 
than risk a financially disastrous judgment at a class trial.68 
For Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs, the most troublesome certification 
requirement tends to be the one that mandates the “predominance” of 
common legal and factual issues over individual ones.69 The 
predominance requirement cannot readily be harmonized with Rule 
10b-5’s reliance element, which calls upon each plaintiff to establish 
her own reliance on the fraud.70 
B. The Affiliated Ute Solution 
The Supreme Court lessened this difficulty somewhat with its 1972 
decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States.71 There the 
Court presumed that the plaintiffs had relied on the fraud in a case 
involving omissions,72 apparently on the theory that reliance on the 
absence of something tends to be difficult to prove.73 But when the 
allegations involve misrepresentations, either solely or in significant 
 
 66 See generally 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 1759–1783 (discussing these 
requirements). 
 67 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment 
(observing that “[a]n order denying certification may confront the plaintiff with a 
situation in which the only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final 
judgment on the merits of an individual claim that, standing along, is far smaller than 
the costs of litigation”).  
 68 See id. (observing that “[a]n order granting certification . . . may force a 
defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the 
risk of potentially ruinous liability”). 
 69 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). For discussion of the predominance requirement, 
see 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 1777–1784. See also id. § 1781.1 (discussing 
the predominance requirement in the specific context of securities class actions). 
 70 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988). 
 71 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
 72 See id. at 153-54. The Affiliated Ute Court made no explicit reference to the 
existence of a presumption of reliance. See id. Yet a consensus developed, now well-
established, that the Court created one. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008) (describing Affiliated Ute as giving 
rise to a presumption of reliance). 
 73 See, e.g., Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2000) (calling it 
“unrealistic” to require the plaintiff to show what he would have done had the facts 
been different). 
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measure, the Affiliated Ute presumption becomes inapposite, leaving 
most would-be Rule 10b-5 class actions to wither on the vine.74 
C. The Fraud-Created-the-Market Solution 
To provide an alternative solution to the reliance problem, some 
lower courts have upheld an additional presumption of reliance as part 
of a claim of “fraud-created-the-market” — i.e., a claim of pervasive 
fraud enabling the marketing of securities that could otherwise not 
have been marketed at any price.75 In general, however, the solution 
has not caught fire, in significant measure because of the uncertainty 
surrounding what constitutes true unmarketability.76 Even where 
accepted, the fraud-created-the-market claim can carry the day in only 
a negligible subset of would-be Rule 10b-5 class actions, given the 
unusualness of the required underlying facts.77 
D. The Basic Solution 
In Basic,78 the Supreme Court provided a more comprehensive 
solution in the form of an alternative Rule 10b-5 claim known as 
 
 74 See, e.g., In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 629 F.3d 213, 219 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (noting that “[n]o court of appeals has applied the Affiliated Ute presumption in 
a case involving a claim that primarily alleges affirmative misrepresentations”). 
 75 See, e.g., T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 
F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983) (affirming certification of a class seeking to allege “fraud-
created-the-market” based on the entitlement of its members to rely on the legality of 
a municipal bond issuance); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1981) (en 
banc) (holding that the plaintiff can recover if he shows that the defendants marketed 
securities “not entitled to be marketed”); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit 
Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007) (reaffirming 
Shores, but finding it inapplicable under the circumstances); Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 
885 F.2d 723, 730, 735-37 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (holding that the plaintiffs 
failed to show lack of marketability, assuming arguendo the cognizability of a claim 
for “fraud-created-the-market”). But see Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 
743,749-55 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting fraud-created-the-market in all its varieties). 
 76 See generally NAGY, PAINTER & SACHS, supra note 61, at 174 n.1 (discussing 
possible definitions of “unmarketable”). 
 77 For the required underlying facts, see supra note 76 and accompanying text. See 
generally Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Fraud Created the Market, 63 
ALA. L. REV. 275 (2012) (arguing that recognition of a fraud-created-the-market claim 
is particularly appropriate in cases involving bonds or manipulative practices); 
Zachary M. Johns, Note, Avoiding the Parade of Horribles: A Revised and Unified Fraud-
Created-the-Market Theory of Presumptive Reliance Under Rule 10b-5, 2012 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1299 (arguing that a fraud-created-the-market claim should be allowed only in a 
narrow set of circumstances). 
 78 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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“fraud-on-the-market” that took the following shape.79 Plaintiffs who 
bought or sold securities in an efficient market are presumed to have 
relied directly on the securities price80 and thereby indirectly on any 
public fraud that distorted the price.81 The presumption not only turns 
reliance into a common issue that predominates over any individual 
ones,82 but also serves as an element of the claim,83 a function which, 
as we will see, carries substantial consequences.84 Fostering the 
Court’s acceptance of this claim was scholarship by Easterbrook and 
Posner rationalizing it on the basis of the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis85 — the idea that the price of a security trading in an 
efficient market reflects all public information (including 
misinformation).86 In addition, Judge Easterbrook had written an 
 
 79 Cf. Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing 
between a traditional Rule 10b-5 claim and a fraud-on-the-market claim). 
 80 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27. The latter footnote suggests that the 
presumption also has a materiality prerequisite. See id. Thereafter, the Court held that 
such a prerequisite exists but that it does not attach at the certification stage. See 
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1199 (2013). For 
further discussion of Amgen, see infra notes 278–90 and accompanying text. 
 81 See Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that “[i]n an 
open and developed market, the dissemination of material misrepresentations or 
withholding of material information typically affects the price of the stock, and 
purchasers generally rely on the price of the stock as a reflection of its value”); see also 
Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (citing Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161). 
 82 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47. 
 83 Cf. Chavin v. McKelvey, 25 F. Supp. 2d 231, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting 
motion to dismiss fraud-on-the-market claim due to absence of public fraud); Stat-
Tech Liquidating Trust v. Fenster, 981 F. Supp. 1325, 1345-46 (D. Colo. 1997) 
(granting summary judgment on fraud-on-the-market claim because of the plaintiff’s 
failure to establish market efficiency). 
 84 See infra notes 100–105 and accompanying text. 
 85 See generally supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 86 The efficient capital markets hypothesis received full articulation with the 
publication of Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). The incorporation of this perspective into 
corporate law began later in the decade. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, 
Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
851, 916 (1992). 
The efficient capital markets hypothesis comes in three versions — weak, semi-
strong, and strong: 
Under the weak form, an efficient market is one in which historical price 
data is reflected in the current price of the stock, such that an ordinary 
investor cannot profit by trading stock based on the historical movements in 
stock price. Under the semi-strong form, an efficient market is one in which 
all publicly available information is reflected in the market price of the 
stock, such that an investor’s efforts to acquire and analyze public 
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opinion upholding the fraud-on-the-market claim only the year 
before.87 
The Basic Court emphasized the defendants’ entitlement to rebut the 
presumption: “Any showing that severs the link between the alleged 
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the 
plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”88 For example, the 
defendants can overcome the plaintiffs’ evidence concerning the 
efficiency of the market or the existence of a “public” fraud.89 Or, they 
can show that the fraud did not fool the market.90 
E. The Lower Courts’ Failure to Engage with the Questions Left Open 
by Basic 
As might be expected of a Supreme Court decision of its scope and 
magnitude, Basic left critical questions unanswered. These included 
how to evaluate the plaintiffs’ market efficiency evidence,91 whether 
the plaintiffs must prove materiality at the certification stage,92 and 
 
information (about the company, the industry, or the economy, for instance) 
will not produce superior investment results. Finally, under the strong form, 
an efficient market is one in which stock price reflects not just historical 
price data or all publicly available information, but all possible information 
— both public and private. 
In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 10 n.16 (1st Cir. 2005). It is the semi-
strong version that gives rise to the fraud-on-the-market claim. See, e.g., Halliburton 
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2420 (2014) (“[T]he 
Court relied upon the ‘semi-strong’ version of [the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis], which posits that the average investor cannot earn above-market returns 
(i.e., ‘beat the market’) in an efficient market by trading on the basis of publicly 
available information.”). 
 87 See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 88 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988). 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id. Alternatively, they can show that a specific plaintiff “traded or would have 
traded despite his knowing the statement was false.” Id. 
 91 Cf. id. at 248 n.28 (noting that “we do not intend conclusively to adopt any 
particular theory of how quickly and completely publicly available information is 
reflected in market price”). 
 92 The Court suggested that the presumption has a materiality prerequisite when it 
made the following statement: “Because most publicly available information is reflected 
in market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, 
therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.” Id. at 247; cf. id. at 
248 n.27 (indicating that there was a materiality prerequisite in the view of the appeals 
court). But the Court did not address whether such a prerequisite, assuming there is 
one, attaches at the certification stage or only at trial (or summary judgment). It 
confronted that question in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 
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whether the defendants can mount a rebuttal at that stage instead of 
waiting until later in the litigation.93 
The questions left open by Basic did not quickly become lower court 
fodder, in contrast to the questions left pending in the wake of other 
major Supreme Court securities opinions.94 Indeed, prior to the twenty-
first century, there appear to have been no reported opinions addressing 
the plaintiffs’ need to prove materiality at the certification stage95 or the 
defendants’ right at that stage to show that the market had not been 
fooled.96 Nor did there appear to be much circuit court activity 
regarding how to measure market efficiency at the certification stage.97 
 
133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013), discussed infra notes 278–90 and accompanying text. 
 93 The Court’s discussion of rebuttal says nothing about when it can occur. See 
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49. 
 94 For example, consider Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 
which examined who qualifies as the “maker” of a fraudulent statement. See Janus 
Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302-03 (2011). The 
lower courts quickly engaged with Janus’s uncertainties. See, e.g., Donald C. 
Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative Securities Jurisprudence, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 933, 954-64 (2013) (discussing the ways in which the lower 
courts have thus far applied Janus to SEC filings). Consider also Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd., which addressed the international reach of Rule 10b-5. See 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, at 255-73 (2010). The lower courts 
quickly engaged with Morrison’s uncertainties as well. See, e.g., David He, Note, 
Beyond Securities Fraud: The Territorial Reach of U.S. Laws After Morrison v. N.A.B., 
2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 148, 170-87 (discussing the ways in which the lower courts 
have thus far applied Morrison to off-exchange transactions). 
 95 The twenty-first century circuit court decisions addressing this question have 
included Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting a 
materiality prerequisite), In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 484 
(2d Cir. 2008) (endorsing a materiality prerequisite), and In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 8 n.11 (1st Cir. 2005) (same). The Supreme Court resolved the split 
of authority in Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1188-89, discussed infra notes 278–90 and 
accompanying text. 
 96 For a twenty-first century decision addressing this question, see In re Salomon, 
544 F.3d at 484 (allowing the defendants to rebut at the certification stage by showing 
that the market had not been fooled), abrogated by Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1203-04. 
 97 For illustrative twenty-first century decisions addressing this question, see In re 
PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 14 (holding that “an efficient market is one in which the 
market price of the stock fully reflects all publicly available information”) and Bell v. 
Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 307, 309-14 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of 
certification for lack of showing of market efficiency where issuer’s stock traded on 
the NASDAQ and additional indices of efficiency were also present). Cf. Binder v. 
Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1054-65 (9th Cir. 1999) (on appeal from final order, 
affirming decertification of class partly on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to 
satisfy factors indicating market efficiency identified by a federal district court in a 
summary judgment case).  
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The non-engagement had two explanations. One involved the 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,98 
while the other concerned the limited opportunities for appealing 
certification orders.99 
1. The Impact of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin 
At issue in Eisen was whether the trial court could hold a pre-
certification merits hearing to determine which side should bear the 
costs of notifying the members of the class.100 Disallowing the hearing, 
the Supreme Court stated as follows: “We find nothing in either the 
language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to 
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to 
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”101 This 
language clearly prohibits a judge from granting certification because 
of the strength of the plaintiffs’ underlying case (or from denying 
certification because of the weakness of that case). But what about the 
right of the judge to conduct a merits inquiry when the merits overlap 
with a predominance inquiry? Although Eisen itself did not involve 
such an overlap, some lower courts read the opinion expansively and 
held that it restricted merits inquiries even in the overlap situation.102 
 
 98 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 99 For discussion of these limited opportunities, see infra notes 106–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 100 Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177. Also at issue was whether identifiable class members had 
to be notified on an individual basis concerning their right to exclude themselves and 
related matters. Id. at 173-76. The Court held that individual notice constituted “an 
unambiguous requirement of Rule 23.” Id. at 176. 
 101 Id. at 177. 
 102 See, e.g., Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(distinguishing between “very basic merits determinations” that are permitted at the 
certification stage and “not so basic” ones that are not permitted) (securities case); 
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 199 F.R.D. 280, 284 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (noting that 
“the substantive allegations in the complaint are accepted as true for purposes of the 
class motion”) (state law fraud and breach of warranty case), vacated, 249 F.3d 672 
(7th Cir. 2001); Prof’l Adjusting Sys. of Am., Inc. v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 64 
F.R.D. 35, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (describing the judge making the certification decision 
as being entitled to “survey the factual scene on a kind of sketchy relief map, leaving 
for later view the myriad of details that cover the terrain”) (antitrust case); cf. Krueger 
v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 163 F.R.D. 433, 440-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting certification 
without undertaking merits inquiry that overlapped inquiry into whether common 
issues existed as required by Rule 23(a)(2) of the FRCP) (age discrimination case). 
For further discussion of Szabo, see infra notes 186–95 and accompanying text. 
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Among the claims affected by the expansive reading of Eisen was 
fraud-on-the-market,103 since the presumption of reliance serves both 
as an element of the claim and as a basis for certification.104 Applying 
the expansive reading, some courts granted certification without 
ascertaining whether the plaintiffs had established market efficiency or 
were otherwise entitled to the presumption of reliance.105 
2. The Limited Avenues for Appealing Certification Orders 
Questions involving fraud-on-the-market tend to arise at the 
certification stage, but certification orders are not appealable as of 
right.106 Today, under Rule 23(f), these orders can be appealed with 
the circuit court’s permission, thereby allowing a plaintiff dissatisfied 
with such an order to seek appellate review rather than to abandon the 
class action litigation altogether.107 
To be sure, in the world as it existed prior to Rule 23(f),108 a 
permissive appeal could be sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).109 
But that provision requires the approval of both the trial court and the 
circuit court, as well as the presence of a controlling question of law as 
to which there is a substantial ground for a difference of opinion.110 
Permission to appeal on this basis is thus rarely granted.111 
Another conceivable solution was to appeal or cross-appeal from a 
later final judgment, which judgment would encompass the earlier 
 
 103 For illustrative additional subject areas affected, see supra note 102. 
 104 See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 105 See, e.g., Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 364 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(referring to the trial court’s “refusal to look beyond the complaint” in deciding 
whether the plaintiff had made a sufficient showing of efficiency for certification 
purposes); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that the trial court had certified a class in a case involving non-public fraud 
without determining whether it was appropriate to extend the presumption to such 
circumstances). 
 106 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467-69 (1978) (holding that a 
certification order is appealable neither as a final judgment nor as an exception to the 
final judgment rule). 
 107 Rule 23(f) did not become effective until Basic was more than ten years old. See 
supra note 14. 
 108 For a comprehensive discussion of the pre-Rule 23(f) world, see Solimine & 
Hines, supra note 57, at 1535-37, 1546-67. 
 109 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012). 
 110 For discussion of these requirements, see 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, § 3929. 
 111 See, e.g., Camacho v. P.R. Ports Auth., 369 F.3d 570, 573 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(observing that appeals allowed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) are “hen’s-teeth rare”). 
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certification order.112 This was the road taken by the defendants in 
Basic itself.113 But that road was often strewn with rocks. A denial of 
certification might lead the plaintiffs to abandon the litigation due to 
an inability to finance individual lawsuits,114 and a grant might prompt 
the defendants to settle rather than risk a huge verdict.115 In neither 
instance would there be a final judgment from which an appeal could 
be taken. 
Finally, there was the possibility of petitioning for mandamus.116 
While a few courts were willing to overturn certification orders on this 
basis,117 a far larger number resisted doing so.118 This resistance had its 
roots in the “exceptional” nature of the mandamus remedy, the 
requisite palpability of the trial court’s error, and the availability of an 
appeal following a final judgment.119 
 
 112 See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (noting 
that “[t]he general rule is that ‘a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until 
final judgment has been entered, in which claims of district court error at any stage of 
the litigation may be ventilated’” (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 
511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994))). 
 113 The trial court in Basic certified the class and then granted the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment on materiality grounds. See Levinson v. Basic Inc., No. 
C79-1220, 1984 WL 1152, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 1984). Then the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the grant of certification and reversed the grant of summary judgment. See 
Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 1986). Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the grant of certification and vacated the summary judgment. See Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249-50 (1988). 
 114 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 115 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 116 See generally Jordon L. Kruse, Comment, Appealability of Class Certification 
Orders: The ‘Mandamus Appeal’ and A Proposal to Amend Rule 23, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
704, 719 (1997) (“With no judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule available and 
the statutory exceptions providing limited effectiveness, the desperate party will 
undoubtedly turn to Section 1651 and the writ of mandamus.”). 
 117 See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1074 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[C]lass 
certification is generally not the kind of subject matter for which mandamus relief is 
available on the grounds that class certification decisions are reviewable on direct 
appeal. However, on the extraordinary facts of this case [this court] find[s] that the 
district judge’s disregard of class action procedures was of such severity and frequency 
so as to warrant its issuance here.”); In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(granting a writ of mandamus and reversing the certification order); In re Bendectin 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984) (same); see also In re Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995). Rhone is discussed infra notes 129–58 
and accompanying text. 
 118 See Solimine & Hines, supra note 57, at 1562. 
 119 See, e.g., In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 159-60 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing 
availability of later appeal and lack of huge error by trial court); In re Catawba Indian 
Tribe of S.C., 973 F.2d 1133, 1138 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that the trial court’s order 
was a “far cry” from an abuse of discretion); In re Allegheny Corp., 634 F.2d 1148 
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In short, the questions that Basic left unresolved seemed destined to 
remain so unless and until such time as appeals of certification orders 
became more widely available. When that time arrived, it allowed not 
only fraud-on-the-market, but also the expansive reading of Eisen, to 
receive sustained attention from the circuit courts. 
II. JUDGE POSNER’S EFFORTS IN CONNECTION WITH RULE 23 
OF THE FRCP 
Any proposed amendment to the FRCP must first pass muster with 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (“the Committee”), an 
amalgam of judges, practitioners, and legal academics appointed by 
the United States Judicial Conference.120 From 1991 through 1997, the 
Committee had under consideration a number of amendments to Rule 
23.121 One of them involved the addition of Rule 23(f),122 which 
granted the circuit courts discretion to hear appeals from certification 
orders123 without the restrictions that had long hobbled permissive 
appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).124 Judge Posner’s opinion in Rhone 
came less than a month after a meeting of the Committee at which 
members supporting and opposing Rule 23(f) articulated their 
positions.125 In the view of its opponents, Rule 23(f) was likely to be 
 
(8th Cir. 1980) (noting lack of extraordinariness and lack of clear error by trial court). 
 120 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
 121 See Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(f), A Good Rulemaking, 69 
TENN. L. REV. 97, 102 (2001) (describing the crucial period as between 1991 and 
1997). For the then-Reporter’s discussion of the amendments under consideration, see 
Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
13, 33-35 (1996). 
 122 The addition of Rule 23(f) became possible in 1992 following Congress’s 
enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e). See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat. 4506, 4506 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) 
(1994)). That section allows opportunities for appealing interlocutory orders to be 
expanded by amending the FRCP. See id. 
 123 For early drafts of Rule 23(f), see Cooper, supra note 121, at 67, 73. The proposal 
to add Rule 23(f) had been on the table since at least 1993. See Proposed Amendments to 
Rule 23, 16 CLASS ACTION REP. 640, 642 (1993) (draft of proposed Rule 23(f)). 
 124 For discussion of those restrictions, see supra notes 109–11 and accompanying 
text. The Committee Note to Rule 23(f) acknowledges and examines the omission of 
these restrictions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to 1998 
amendment. 
 125 See EDWARD H. COOPER, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES: MEETING MINUTES, 
FEBRUARY 16 AND 17, 1995 (1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/min-cv2.htm. 
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exploited primarily by defendants with weak substantive arguments in 
order to foment delay.126 
This Part shows the ways in which Judge Posner communicated to 
the Committee his support for the Rule 23(f) proposal127 as well as for 
another change to Rule 23 that the Committee ultimately rejected. The 
latter change would have inserted language into the Rule allowing the 
strength of the plaintiff’s underlying case to serve as a factor in the 
certification decision, thereby overriding the holding of Eisen.128 
A. In re Rhone-Polenc Rorer, Inc. 
Judge Posner used his opinion in Rhone129 as his vehicle for 
communicating with the Committee.130 The Rhone litigation pitted 
hemophiliacs who had contracted HIV against drug manufacturers 
whose products had allegedly caused their infection.131 After the trial 
court granted certification,132 the defendants pursued what in all 
likelihood was their only means of obtaining immediate review — a 
writ of mandamus in the Seventh Circuit.133 Their petition was 
 
 126 See id. Another reason for caution about the addition of the Rule 23(f) proposal 
in the view of some on the Committee was that such an addition had value mainly as a 
means of obtaining judicial review of other changes to Rule 23 that were then being 
contemplated. If the other changes did not materialize, then, on this view, the need for 
Rule 23(f) became less clear. See EDWARD H. COOPER, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES: MEETING MINUTES, NOVEMBER 9 AND 10, 1995 (1995), [hereinafter NOV. 
MEETING MINUTES], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/Minutes/min-cv11.htm. 
 127 The argument made in this Part, namely, that Judge Posner intentionally 
communicated his support for the Rule 23(f) proposal in his opinion in Rhone, is 
distinct from the argument made elsewhere that his opinion had the effect of moving 
the proposal forward. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 733 (2013) (describing the Rhone decision as “[a] critical event 
leading to Rule 23(f)”); Linda S. Mullenix, Professor Ed Cooper: Zen Minimalist, 46 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 661, 669 (2013) [hereinafter Zen Minimalist] (noting that Rhone 
“clearly provided the impetus for Committee action”); Solimine & Hines, supra note 
57, at 1592 n.308 (referring to Rhone as “a decision that, in part, drove the adoption of 
Rule 23(f)”).  
 128 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Eisen is discussed supra 
notes 100–105 and accompanying text. 
 129 In re Rhone-Polenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 130 See supra note 127 (distinguishing the argument made in this Part regarding 
Judge Posner’s intent in his Rhone opinion from the argument made elsewhere 
regarding the effect of that opinion). 
 131 See Wadleigh v. Rhone-Polenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 413-14 (N.D. Ill. 1994) 
(granting certification), rev’d on writ of mandamus sub nom. In re Rhone, 51 F.3d 1293. 
 132 Id. at 427. 
 133 Possibly they could have sought permission to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
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referred to a panel that included then-Chief Judge Posner, who, over a 
strong dissent, granted it and reversed the certification order.134 
B. Rhone and the Proposal to Add Rule 23(f) 
While not mentioning the pending Rule 23(f) proposal directly, 
Judge Posner managed to make three clear, if implicit, arguments in its 
favor. As we will see, it would have been exceedingly difficult, if not 
impossible, to make one of the arguments explicitly and that argument 
might have emerged too far into the open if he had been overt about 
the others.135 
First, he offered a compelling depiction of the predicament faced by 
the defendants who petitioned for mandamus: They could either risk 
devastating liability at a class trial or settle for an exorbitant amount 
and thereby forego the final order needed for an appeal of the 
certification order said to be so rife with flaws as to qualify as 
“usurpative.”136 His portrayal of their predicament spoke eloquently to 
the need for Rule 23(f), which would have offered them a solution had 
it been on the books.137 
Second, he highlighted the defendants’ victories in twelve of the 
thirteen individual trials that had been held to date, deducing that 
they probably had strong substantive arguments.138 He thus countered 
 
§ 1292(b), an option discussed supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. One 
commentator has suggested that the defendants made such an attempt but were 
rebuffed by the trial court. See Kruse, supra note 116, at 728. 
 134 See In re Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1304. The dissenter was Judge Rovner. See id. 
(Rovner, J., dissenting). For illustrative extensive treatments of this wide-ranging 
opinion, see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1369-79 (2003); Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an 
Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. 
REV. 527, 577-84 (2002). 
 135 Circumspection was apparently no disadvantage in communicating with the 
Committee, which read with great care the contemporaneous case law relevant to 
their work. Cf. Mullenix, Zen Minimalist, supra note 127, at 669 (noting that the 
Committee’s response to Rhone illustrates “the very real synergy between the Advisory 
Committee and current developments in the judicial arena”). 
 136 He equated such settlements with “blackmail,” borrowing phraseology used by 
Judge Henry J. Friendly in a book published more than twenty years earlier. See In re 
Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1298-99 (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A 
GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)). 
 137 For commentary on Rule 23(f), see infra note 159. 
 138 See In re Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1299. The Committee took note of this emphasis. See 
EDWARD H. COOPER, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES: MEETING MINUTES, APRIL 18 
AND 19, 1996 (1996) [hereinafter APR. MEETING MINUTES], available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/cv4-1896.htm. 
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the position expressed by certain Committee members that only 
defendants with flimsy arguments would likely avail themselves of 
Rule 23(f).139 
Third, he intensified the consequences likely to result if the 
Committee rejected Rule 23(f). In the event of such a rejection, Rhone 
would no doubt have prompted a barrage of mandamus petitions 
seeking to subject certification orders to appellate review.140 Judge 
Posner gave those petitions an added leg-up by suggesting that the 
orders routinely inflicted irreparable injury on the losing parties: 
“[Certification] orders often, perhaps typically, inflict irreparable injury 
on the defendants (just as orders denying class certification often, 
perhaps typically, inflict irreparable injury on the members of the 
class).”141 By aiding and abetting the widespread use of mandamus, he 
undermined a central feature of the writ that the Supreme Court had 
repeatedly underscored — its extraordinariness.142 Having placed 
mandamus at greater risk than it would have been without his 
opinion, he then left it to the Committee to wrestle with what to do. 
To have said all this out loud would no doubt have courted a grant of 
certiorari.143 
The Committee seemed clearly to have understood that its 
disposition of the Rule 23(f) proposal carried implications that had 
been exacerbated by Rhone. Immediately before voting unanimously in 
favor of the proposal,144 the members discussed the “recent cases” that 
 
 139 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.  
 140 Cf. In re Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1090 (6th Cir. 1996) (granting 
mandamus to overturn a certification order partly in reliance on Rhone). 
 141 In re Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1295 (emphasis added). 
 142 See, e.g., Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 402-03 
(1976) (“A judicial readiness to issue the writ of mandamus in anything less than an 
extraordinary situation would run the real risk of defeating the very policies sought to 
be furthered by that judgment of Congress.”); Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 
(1967) (“[I]t is clear that only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 
‘usurpation of power’ will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.”). In her 
dissent, Judge Rovner argued that Judge Posner’s approach undermined the writ’s 
extraordinariness. See In re Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1304-05 (Rovner, J., dissenting). To be 
sure, Judge Posner himself at least acknowledged the extraordinary nature of the writ. 
See id. at 1294 (majority opinion); cf. Kruse, supra note 116, at 728 (describing Judge 
Posner as having given “lip service” to the extraordinariness of mandamus before 
“disregard[ing] it completely”). 
 143 See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.5, at 250 (10th ed. 
2013) (noting that “[a] direct conflict between the decision of the court of appeals of 
which review is being sought and a decision of the Supreme Court is one of the 
strongest possible grounds for securing the issuance of a writ of certiorari”). 
 144 See COOPER, APR. MEETING MINUTES, supra note 138. 
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had used mandamus to overturn certification orders, one being Rhone 
itself145 and the other a case that had followed in Rhone’s wake.146 The 
view was expressed that, if adopted, Rule 23(f) would preserve 
mandamus as “a special instrument.”147 
C. Rhone and the Proposal to Override Eisen 
Judge Posner held the certification order to be “usurpative” partly 
because of its failure to take account of the seeming weakness of the 
plaintiffs’ case in chief.148 This holding collided frontally with Eisen,149 
which read Rule 23 to prohibit the strength of the plaintiffs’ case from 
driving the decision whether to certify.150 It is inconceivable that this 
learned judge, known to write his own opinions,151 was unaware of 
this prohibition.152 
Context, however, is everything. It seems reasonable to assume that 
Judge Posner disregarded Eisen in order to alert the Committee to his 
antipathy to it and thereby to prompt an amendment that would allow 
the merits to be considered.153 Had he made his antipathy explicit, he 
would not only have undermined his holding concerning the 
usurpativeness of the certification order but also significantly 
increased the likelihood that the Supreme Court would grant certiorari 
and take him to task for his lack of deference to its rulings.154 
 
 145 For some explicit references to Rhone in the Committee Minutes, see id.; and 
COOPER, NOV. MEETING MINUTES, supra note 126. 
 146 See In re Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 147 See COOPER, APR. MEETING MINUTES, supra note 138. 
 148 See In re Rhone-Polenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting 
that “the plaintiffs’ claims, despite their human appeal, lack legal merit”). 
 149 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 150 For discussion of Eisen, see supra notes 100–105 and accompanying text. 
 151 See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (and 
Should We Care)?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077, 1080 & n.6, 1081 (2005) [hereinafter 
Which Judges Write]. 
 152 Cf. Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 838 F.2d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1988) (per 
curiam) (noting, with Judge Posner on the panel, that “the propriety of class 
certification does not depend on the outcome of the suit” and citing Eisen). 
 153 To some extent, at least, his seeking to capture the Committee’s attention with 
respect to one proposal lends credence to his doing so with respect to another. 
 154 See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 143, § 4.5, at 250 (noting that “[a] direct conflict 
between the decision of the court of appeals of which review is being sought and a 
decision of the Supreme Court is one of the strongest possible grounds for securing 
the issuance of a writ of certiorari”). 
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He succeeded in getting the Committee’s attention. Indeed, upon 
recognizing Rhone’s failure to follow Eisen,155 the Committee pondered 
whether to endorse an Eisen override.156 In the end, however, it 
decided against proceeding in this direction.157 Had there been an 
override of Eisen, it would have put to rest the expansive reading of 
that decision that had long stood in the way of full judicial 
engagement with fraud-on-the-market issues.158 
Rule 23(f) ran the remainder of its gauntlet and became effective on 
December 1, 1998.159 In the years since, it has played a pivotal role in 
the evolution of fraud-on-the-market by allowing circuit courts to 
engage with fraud-on-the-market issues that would otherwise have 
escaped appellate review.160 
 
 155 See, e.g., COOPER, APR. MEETING MINUTES, supra note 138 (observing that the 
Rhone decision provides “support for required consideration of the merits”); COOPER, 
NOV. MEETING MINUTES, supra note 126 (noting that “[a]lthough the Rhone-Poulenc 
decision in the Seventh Circuit does not say so expressly, it turns in part on an 
estimate of the probably merits of the class claim”). 
 156 The language that would allow the merits to be considered first appeared as 
Rule 23(b)(1)(3)(E) in the November 1995 draft. Compare Cooper, supra note 121, at 
68 (text of November 1995 draft), with id. at 64-67 (text of preceding February draft). 
 157 See COOPER, APR. MEETING MINUTES, supra note 138. 
 158 See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text. 
 159 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. For discussion of Rule 23(f), see 7B 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, § 1802.2; Solimine & Hines, supra note 57, 1535-36; Aimee 
G. Mackay, Comment, Appealability of Class Certification Orders Under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(f): Toward A Principled Approach, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 755, 772 (2002). 
 160 See, e.g., Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1175 
(9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (rejecting a materiality prerequisite to 
certification as well as a truth-on-the-market defense to certification); In re DVI, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated by Amgen, 133 S. Ct. 1184 
(rejecting a loss causation prerequisite to certification but permitting the defendant to 
defeat certification by showing a lack of materiality); Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 
679 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting materiality and loss causation prerequisites to 
certification); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 
F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding, as a prerequisite to certification, a showing as to 
the defendants’ primary liability); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 
(2d Cir. 2006) (examining the application of Rule 23’s certification requirements to a 
fraud-on-the-market case); In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2005) (addressing the standard for measuring market efficiency); Gariety v. Grant 
Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2004) (directing the trial court to consider 
further the sufficiency of the showing as to market efficiency and primary liability). 
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III. JUDGES EASTERBROOK AND POSNER AND THE INITIAL RULE 23(F) 
OPINIONS 
The Seventh Circuit issued seventeen reported Rule 23(f) opinions 
during the Rule’s first nine years on the books, every single one of 
which was written by Judge Easterbrook or Judge Posner.161 This Part 
explains how they came to corner the market on these opinions (“the 
initial Rule 23(f) opinions”). It then examines the ones with special 
relevance for fraud-on-the-market. 
A. A Brief Primer on Rule 23(f) Opinions 
Rule 23(f) authorizes each circuit court to “permit an appeal from 
an order [of a district court] granting or denying class action 
certification . . . if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the 
circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered.”162 A petition for 
permission to appeal is assigned first to a motions panel, which, if it 
grants the petition, typically surrenders the appeal for reassignment to 
a merits panel.163 Most petitions, however, are denied by unpublished 
order.164 
 
 161 Judge Easterbrook’s opinions include: Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 505 F.3d 736 
(7th Cir. 2007); Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006); Gates 
v. Towery, 430 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2005); Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 
F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 
2002); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2002); Szabo v Bridgeport 
Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F.3d 
894 (7th Cir. 1999); Gary v. Sheahan, 188 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 1999); Blair v. Equifax 
Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999). 
Judge Posner’s opinions include: In re Household Int’l Tax Reduction Plan, 441 F.3d 
500 (7th Cir. 2006); In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2005); Carnegie v. 
Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2004); Dechert v. Cadle Co., 333 F.3d 
801 (7th Cir. 2003); Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003); 
In re Bemis Co., 279 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 2002); Isaacs v. Sprint Corp., 261 F.3d 679 
(7th Cir. 2001).  
 162 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). The final sentence of Rule 23(f) provides as follows: “An 
appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the 
court of appeals so orders.” Id. 
 163 See, e.g., Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(noting that the Rule 23(f) petition was previously granted by a motions panel); 
Regents, 482 F.3d at 379 (same); Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 
2004) (same). 
 164 See Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law and 
Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277, 284 (2008) (noting that “only 10% 
of the ‘decisions’ accepting or rejecting a Rule 23(f) petition are available by searching 
published or electronically available opinions”); Workshop, Tools for Ensuring that 
Settlements Are “Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate,” 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1197, 1213 
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Reported Rule 23(f) opinions come in three varieties — those from 
merits panels to which the appeal is assigned after a motion panel 
grants the petition;165 a few from motions panels that explain why the 
petition was denied;166 and those from motions panels that grant the 
petition and also decide the appeal (“combination opinions”).167 
Combination opinions appear to be confined almost exclusively to the 
Seventh Circuit.168 
B. The Assignments of the Initial Rule 23(f) Opinions 
The task of assigning opinions falls to the panel’s presiding judge — 
the member in active service with the greatest number of years on the 
court.169 When Rule 23(f) became effective at the end of 1998, Judges 
 
(2005) (“The vast majority of our rulings on 23(f) motions are not published.” 
(quoting Judge Diane P. Wood)). 
Occasionally a motions panel will issue a reported opinion explaining its denial of a 
petition. For examples, see infra note 166. 
 165 See cases cited supra note 163. 
 166 See, e.g., Arnold Chapman v. Wagener Equities Inc., 747 F.3d 489, 493 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (denying petition for leave to appeal, citing numerous delays caused by 
plaintiffs and lack of merit of the case); Gelder v. Coxcom Inc., 696 F.3d 966, 969 
(10th Cir. 2012) (denying immediate review because none of the concerns justifying 
an interlocutory appeal were present); In re Delta Airlines, 310 F.3d 953, 962 (6th Cir. 
2002) (denying permission to appeal because an appeal would not serve the purposes 
envisioned by Rule 23(f)). 
 167 See, e.g., Reliable Money Order, Inc. v. McKnight Sales Co., 704 F.3d 489, 496-
502 (7th Cir. 2013) (granting permission to appeal while also denying plaintiff’s 
motion to dismiss and affirming class certification); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 488, 492 (7th Cir. 2012) (granting 
permission to appeal and reversing the denial of class certification); Isaacs v. Sprint 
Corp., 261 F.3d 679, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2001) (granting leave to appeal and reversing 
the order granting certification). 
 168 The grounds for this conclusion are as follows. Emory Law School Professor 
Richard D. Freer collected 102 decisions through 2007 adjudicating appeals permitted 
pursuant to Rule 23(f). See Richard D. Freer, Interlocutory Review of Class Action 
Certification Decisions: A Preliminary Empirical Study of Federal and State Experience, 35 
W. ST. U. L. REV. 13, 29-46 (2007). Besides those from the Seventh Circuit, there were 
very few opinions of the combination variety — two from the First Circuit and one each 
from the Fourth and Eighth Circuits. See Tilley v. TJX Co., Inc., 345 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 
2003); Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2002); Lienhart v. Dryvit 
Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2001); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 
F.3d 288 (1st Cir. 2000). Interestingly, and perhaps significantly, the author of both 
Tilley and Waste was Judge Bruce Selya, who is widely cited outside his own circuit. See 
Choi & Gulati, An Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 50, 53, 56. Moreover, the same 
can be said of the author of Lienhart, Judge Karen Williams. See id. at 53. 
 169 See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). If the current chief judge is a member of the 
panel, then it is she who presides. See id. 
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Easterbrook and Posner were already among the Seventh Circuit’s 
most senior active members.170 As a result, one or the other was the 
presiding judge on all but one of the panels that issued the initial Rule 
23(f) opinions.171 When presiding, Judge Posner assigned all such 
opinions either to himself or Easterbrook, to whom he was senior.172 
When Judge Easterbrook presided, he assigned them only to 
himself.173 These assignments are summarized in Table 1.174 
 
  
 
 170 See Seventh Circuit Chronology, supra note 52. 
 171 The only initial Rule 23(f) opinion issued by a panel over which neither 
Easterbrook nor Posner presided was Jefferson v. Ingersoll International Inc., 195 F.3d 
894 (7th Cir. 1999). The presiding judge was John Coffey, who assigned the opinion 
to Judge Easterbrook. Judge Coffey joined the Seventh Circuit in 1982, whereas Judge 
Easterbrook joined the court in 1985. See Seventh Circuit Chronology, supra note 52. 
 172 See Seventh Circuit Chronology, supra note 52. Judge Posner may have assigned 
to himself the opinion in In re Household International Tax Reduction Plan, 441 F.3d 
500 (7th Cir. 2006), because of his authorship of a previous opinion in the same 
litigation. See Matz v. Household Int’l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 388 F.3d 570, 572 
(7th Cir. 2004). 
Also worthy of note is Judge Posner’s authorship of the opinion in Richardson 
Electronics, Ltd. v. Panache Broadcasting of Pennsylvania, Inc., 202 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 
2000), which, in the course of denying an appeal sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b), addressed the interface between the latter and Rule 23(f). 
 173 Judge Easterbrook may have assigned to himself the opinion in Asher v. Baxter 
International, Inc., 505 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2007), because of his authorship of a 
previous opinion in the same litigation. See Asher v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 
728 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 174 After 2007, authorship of Rule 23(f) opinions in the Seventh Circuit became 
more widely shared. See, e.g., Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 725 F.3d 803 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (opinion by Judge Diane Wood in an ERISA case); Messner v. Northshore 
Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012) (opinion by Judge David F. 
Hamilton in an antitrust case); Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 
2012) (opinion by Judge Michael S. Kanne in a Fair Labor Standards Act case), 
vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013); Kartman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 
883 (7th Cir. 2011) (opinion by Judge Diane S. Sykes in an insurance case). 
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Table 1. Presiding Judges of Panels Issuing Reported Rule 23(f) 
Opinions, 1999–2007175 
Case Year Presiding Judge Opinion By 
Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc. 1999 Posner Easterbrook 
Gary v. Sheahan 1999 Easterbrook Easterbrook 
Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc. 1999 Coffey Easterbrook 
Szabo v Bridgeport Machs., Inc. 2001 Posner Easterbrook 
Isaacs v. Sprint Corp. 2001 Posner Posner 
In re Bemis Co. 2002 Posner Posner 
West v. Prudential Sec., Inc. 2002 Easterbrook Easterbrook 
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. 2002 Easterbrook Easterbrook 
Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp. 2003 Posner Posner 
Dechert v. Cadle Co. 2003 Posner Posner 
Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. 2004 Easterbrook Easterbrook 
Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc. 2004 Posner Posner 
Gates v. Towery 2004 Easterbrook Easterbrook 
In re Allstate Ins. Co. 2005 Posner Posner 
Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. 2006 Easterbrook Easterbrook 
In re Household Int’l Tax Reduction Plan 2006 Posner Posner 
Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc. 2007 Easterbrook Easterbrook 
 
These opinions likely held allure because of the opportunities that 
they presented to shape the procedure governing Rule 23(f) as well as 
to decide major questions of class action law.176 To be sure, it is also 
possible that Judges Easterbrook and Posner wrote these opinions 
because the other panel members were averse to doing so, but it is by 
no means immediately obvious what would prompt that aversion.177 
 
 175 For the full citations to these cases, see supra note 161. 
 176 See, e.g., Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(highlighting the fundamentals of consumer class actions); Carnegie v. Household 
Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing transformation of a settlement 
class into a litigation class); Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 
2003) (highlighting the fundamentals of pollution class actions); Szabo v. Bridgeport 
Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing the viability of expanded 
reading of Supreme Court’s Eisen decision); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 
894 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing the method for classifying actions that seek both 
injunctive relief and damages); Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (establishing the framework for identifying worthwhile Rule 23(f) 
petitions). 
 177 Rule 23(f) is a relatively confined, reasonably straightforward provision that 
would seem to fall readily within the grasp of any competent judge. For commentary 
on the Rule, see supra note 159. Moreover, there is the fact that a wide variety of 
Seventh Circuit judges have been writing Rule 23(f) opinions after 2007. See supra 
note 174. 
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C. The Panels that Issued the Initial Rule 23(f) Opinions 
A judge must be a member of the panel issuing an opinion in order 
to be eligible to write it.178 How was it that all the panels that issued 
the initial Rule 23(f) opinions included either Judge Easterbrook or 
Judge Posner? The answer involves the nature of the panels. As Table 
2 shows, eleven of the seventeen — more than sixty percent — were 
motions panels that granted permission to appeal and then retained 
the appeal for decision. 
 
Table 2. Initial Rule 23(f) Opinions, By Opinion Type179 
Denials of Petitions 
by Motions Panels 
Adjudication of Appeals 
by Merits Panels 
Gary Bridgestone Asher 
Bemis Dechert Gates 
Adjudication of Appeals by Motions Panels 
Blair Jefferson Szabo Murray 
Isaacs West Mejdrech Household 
Allen Carnegie Allstate
 
If the motions panels had instead surrendered the appeals for 
reassignment to merits panels, the prevailing pattern in every other 
circuit,180 some percentage of the merits panels would almost certainly 
not have included Judge Easterbrook or Judge Posner. That in turn 
would have diminished the number of Rule 23(f) opinions that they 
would have been eligible to write. 
D. The Initial Rule 23(f) Opinions with a Bearing on Fraud-on-the-
Market 
The initial Rule 23(f) opinions carried substantial significance for 
fraud-on-the-market’s evolution. This significance was driven both by 
the opinions as a group as well as by three specific combination 
 
 178 See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2012). 
 179 For the full citation to these cases, see supra note 161. 
 180 For the basis for this conclusion, see supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
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opinions. The three opinions were all by Judge Easterbrook, two of 
them written with Judge Posner on the panel.181 
1. The Opinions as a Group 
A number of the initial Rule 23(f) opinions promoted active use of 
the Rule by virtue of their emphasis on the importance of the issues 
presented182 or their citation of multiple reasons for granting an 
appeal.183 Moreover, the two opinions denying permission to appeal 
did not offset this thrust, since each denial rested on an 
insurmountable obstacle — the elapse of the filing period184 or the 
inapplicability of Rule 23 to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission.185 
2. Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc. 
At issue in Szabo was the expansive reading of Eisen,186 pursuant to 
which the judge must avoid a merits inquiry that overlaps with a 
certification inquiry.187 The underlying lawsuit had been brought by 
tools purchasers against a manufacturer for authorizing fraud for use 
by its dealer-agents across the country.188 
 
 181 The three opinions are those in West v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 282 F.3d 935 
(7th Cir. 2002), Szabo, 249 F.3d 672, and Blair, 181 F.3d 832. Judge Posner was a 
member of the panels in both Szabo and Blair. See Szabo, 249 F.3d at 673; Blair, 181 
F.3d at 833.  
 182 See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505, 506 (7th Cir. 2005) (addressing a 
“novel and important issue” involving certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of the FRCP); 
Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 2004) (addressing 
“novel” and “important” issues involving the transformation of a settlement class into 
a litigation class and the application of judicial estoppel to class actions); In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2002) (addressing choice 
of law rule with “import to other suits”); West, 282 F.3d at 937 (addressing “novel and 
potentially important” fraud-on-the-market issue); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 
F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999) (addressing the “important” and “unresolved” issue of 
the interface between Rule 23(b)(2) of the FRCP and money damages). 
 183 See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1015-16 (citing differences in state 
law that may proceed as nationwide class actions); West, 282 F.3d at 937 (granting 
appeal to review an expansion of the fraud on the markets doctrine and class action as 
a way to litigate securities action to completion); Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675 (citing two 
reasons for granting appeal: (1) high dollar amount; and (2) to resolve conflict among 
district courts). 
 184 See Gary v. Sheahan, 188 F.3d 891, 893 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 185 See In re Bemis Co., 279 F.3d 419, 421 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 186 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 187 See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.  
 188 See Szabo, 249 F.3d at 674. There was also a claim for breach of warranty. See id. 
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The question whether the manufacturer had authorized the fraud 
implicated the cause of action, but it was likewise relevant to the 
predominance inquiry. If there had been such an authorization, the 
applicable fraud law would come from the manufacturer’s home state, 
which offered a single set of rules that would allow common legal 
issues to predominate.189 If there had not been an authorization, 
however, the fraud law would be drawn from all the states in which 
the dealers operated, rendering predominance impossible.190 
The trial court granted certification without inquiring into whether 
the authorization had occurred.191 In its view, Eisen prohibited the 
inquiry because of the relationship to the merits.192 
On behalf of a panel that included Judge Posner,193 Judge 
Easterbrook reversed the certification order in an opinion that 
decisively rejected the expansive reading of Eisen: 
[N]othing in . . . Rule 23, or the opinion in Eisen, prevents the 
district court from looking beneath the surface of a complaint 
to conduct the inquiries identified in that rule and exercise the 
discretion it confers. Plaintiffs cannot tie the judge’s hands by 
making allegations relevant to both the merits and class 
certification.194 
This perspective soon took hold in other circuits, which became able 
to engage with fraud-on-the market in ways that had previously 
exceeded their grasp.195 
3. Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc. 
At issue in Blair was a certification order in a federal consumer 
action.196 Judge Easterbrook’s opinion offered a framework for 
 
 189 See id. 
 190 See id. 
 191 See id. at 677. 
 192 See id. 
 193 See id. at 673. 
 194 Id. at 677. 
 195 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 
F.3d 372, 381 & n.8 (5th Cir. 2007) (relying on Szabo as well as on decisions that 
relied on Szabo); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 38-41 (2d Cir. 
2006) (discussing Szabo and the decisions that it spawned and concluding that 
“[w]e . . . align ourselves with Szabo, Gariety, and the other decisions discussed 
above . . .”); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Szabo and noting that “[a]t bottom, we agree with the conclusion reached by 
the Seventh Circuit . . .”). 
 196 Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 835-36 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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identifying worthwhile Rule 23(f) petitions.197 His framework became 
a model for the other circuits.198 
To exemplify the legal issues that ought to merit the circuit courts’ 
attention, Judge Easterbrook turned to doctrines that facilitate Rule 
10b-5 class actions: 
Class certifications . . . have induced judges to remake some 
substantive doctrine in order to render the litigation 
manageable. See Hal S. Scott, The Impact of Class Actions on 
Rule 10b–5, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1971). This interaction of 
procedure with the merits justifies an earlier appellate look.199 
Those doctrines include the presumptions of reliance for “pure 
omissions”200 and for cases in which fraud “creates” the market,201 but 
by far the foremost exemplar is fraud-on-the-market, the barely 
concealed target towards which circuit courts were invited to direct 
their energies.202 
By calling for a “look” at these doctrines,203 Judge Easterbrook was 
quite clearly exhorting the circuits to trim them back. To be sure, it is 
possible that he intended only to dangle fraud-on-the-market as red 
meat and thereby to induce the other circuits to make full use of the 
power that Rule 23(f) vested in them.204 
To justify taking a hard line on Rule 10b-5 class actions, Judge 
Easterbrook invoked their tendency to precipitate in terrorem 
settlements of the sort depicted by Judge Posner in Rhone: 
[A] grant of class status can put considerable pressure on the 
defendant to settle, even when the plaintiff’s probability of 
success on the merits is slight. Many corporate executives are 
unwilling to bet their company that they are in the right in 
 
 197 See id. at 833-35. 
 198 See Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that in Blair, “the Seventh Circuit articulated fundamental principles that have been 
echoed by other circuits”); 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, § 3931.1 (noting that 
“other circuits have followed essentially the same paths” as those laid down in Blair). 
 199 See Blair, 181 F.3d at 834 (emphasis added). 
 200 See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
 201 See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 202 See supra notes 78–90 and accompanying text. 
 203 See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 204 In this respect he may have been seeking to counter the view that interlocutory 
review should be reserved for exceptional situations. Cf. Chamberlan v. Ford Motor 
Co., 402 F.3d 952, 955, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that “[w]e begin with the 
premise that Rule 23(f) review should be a rare occurrence”). 
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big-stakes litigation, and a grant of class status can propel the 
stakes of a case into the stratosphere. In re Rhone–Poulenc 
Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), observes . . . that 
class actions can have this effect on risk-averse corporate 
executives (and corporate counsel) . . . . Empirical studies of 
securities class actions imply that this is common.205 
It is remarkable that this passage, coming from a renowned securities 
expert widely understood to write his own opinions,206 omits any 
reference to the PSLRA and the SLUSA, major statutes enacted for the 
very purpose of combating the in terrorem settlements at issue.207 On 
the books for almost four years, the PSLRA gave the defendants 
multiple tools for obtaining early dismissals and put control of the 
actions in the hands of the largest investors.208 Available for about a 
year, the SLUSA prevented the plaintiffs from making an end-run 
around the PSLRA by filing their securities class actions in state 
court.209 Nor were the PSLRA and the SLUSA mentioned indirectly 
through the medium of the cited law review articles, since all of them 
were published before the statutes were enacted.210 
Why did Judge Easterbrook fail to acknowledge these statutes? The 
answer is likely linked to why he focused on securities class actions in 
the first place. Whether he did so to urge the circuit courts to restrict 
those actions211 or instead to generate frequent use of Rule 23(f),212 he 
would have undercut his goal by acknowledging the PSLRA and the 
SLUSA’s ameliorative effects. He may also have doubted their 
effectiveness, possibly on the ground that they failed to do enough to 
 
 205 Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added). The journal citations offered in support consisted of the following: Janet 
Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class 
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 505-14 (1991); Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are 
Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733 (1994); Roberta Romano, 
The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991). 
Judge Easterbrook made very similar comments in an opinion three years later. See 
infra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 206 See Choi & Gulati, Which Judges Write, supra note 151, at 1080-81 n.6. 
 207 See NAGY, PAINTER & SACHS, supra note 61, at 10; see also Richard W. Painter, 
Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of 
Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32-34 (1998). 
 208 See NAGY, PAINTER & SACHS, supra note 61, at 10.  
 209 See id. at 18. 
 210 The PSLRA and the SLUSA were enacted, respectively, in 1995 and in 1998. See 
supra notes 40–41. 
 211 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 212 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
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bar the filing of frivolous cases.213 Standing alone, however, such 
doubts, assuming he had them, seem insufficient to account for the 
failure to mention major pieces of legislation directed at the problem 
under discussion. 
Likewise noteworthy was the short shrift that Judge Easterbrook 
gave to Eisen’s bar on merits-driven certification orders.214 Indeed, he 
went so far as to observe that those orders might be permissible: 
“[O]ne of the fundamental unanswered questions is whether judges 
should be influenced by their tentative view of the merits when 
deciding whether to certify a class . . . .”215 To be sure, he may have 
meant only to try to keep the fires burning for a future override of 
Eisen, perhaps at the behest of his fellow panel member, Judge Posner, 
who, it will be recalled, had tried to precipitate such an amendment 
four years earlier.216 But by juxtaposing an assault on Eisen with one 
on fraud-on-the-market, he invited, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, the use of a lax approach to the former to accomplish 
a constriction on the latter. 
4. West v. Prudential Securities, Inc. 
At issue in West v. Prudential Securities, Inc. was a certification order 
in a fraud-on-the-market case.217 Judge Easterbrook used the opinion 
to reinforce the themes advanced in Blair — the denigration of Eisen 
and fraud-on-the-market and disregard for the PSLRA and the 
SLUSA.218 
The underlying lawsuit grew out of a stockbroker’s false tip to 
eleven customers about a specific public company.219 The lawsuit was 
not filed on behalf of the customers alone, because, as Judge 
Easterbrook noted, that would have put them at risk of prosecution 
for insider trading.220 The lawsuit was instead filed on behalf of all 
who had bought stock in the company in question during the time the 
tip circulated.221 The tip had not been publicized,222 but the plaintiffs 
 
 213 Cf. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 914. 
 214 For discussion of that bar, see supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 215 Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
 216 See supra notes 148–58 and accompanying text. 
 217 See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 936-37 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 218 For discussion of Blair, see supra notes 196–216 and accompanying text. 
 219 See West, 282 F.3d at 936. 
 220 See id. at 936-37. 
 221 See id. at 937. 
  
2015] Superstar Judges as Entrepreneurs 1243 
argued that it had nonetheless become known to the market through 
the medium of increasing demand.223 The trial judge granted 
certification without examining the substance of the plaintiffs’ 
argument.224 
Judge Easterbrook faulted the trial judge for failing to confront the 
plaintiffs’ argument as Szabo required.225 Confronting this argument 
himself, he rejected it as unsubstantiated and reversed the certification 
order.226 
Judge Easterbrook’s seemingly unexceptionable reversal arguably 
does not give Eisen its due. Recall that the threat of an insider trading 
prosecution removed the prospect of a traditional Rule 10b-5 claim 
with its attendant individual reliance issues.227 With those individual 
reliance issues firmly out of the picture, the predominance of common 
reliance issues was a virtual given, leaving the lack of publicity to pose 
a problem only in connection with whether a fraud-on-the-market 
claim had been stated.228 By treating the defect in the claim as one 
involving certification, Judge Easterbrook undercut the necessity of 
distinguishing between certification defects and merits defects, thereby 
emasculating the distinction lying at the heart of Eisen.229 
What would prompt Judge Easterbrook to conflate the two defects? 
In all likelihood, he did so because he could not resist the opportunity 
to dispose of an ultimately frivolous action, for which a trial date had 
already been set.230 
Judge Easterbrook reaffirmed his previous denigration of fraud-on-
the-market by taking aim at Basic itself: “The district court did not 
identify any causal link between non-public information and securities 
prices, let alone show that the link is as strong as the one deemed 
sufficient (by a bare majority) in Basic (only four of the six Justices who 
 
 222 See id. 
 223 See id. at 939. 
 224 See id. at 938. 
 225 See id. at 938-39 (citing Szabo and noting that “[t]ough questions must be faced 
and squarely decided, if necessary by holding hearings and choosing between 
competing perspectives”). 
 226 See id. at 938-40. 
 227 See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 228 The presumption of reliance is an element of the claim as well as a solution to 
the predominance problem. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 229 See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text. 
 230 See West, 282 F.3d at 937-38. No doubt compounding the irresistibleness was 
his apparent lack of regard for Eisen in the first place. See supra notes 214–16 and 
accompanying text. 
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participated in that case endorsed the fraud-on-the-market doctrine).”231 
The two parentheticals, highlighted here for emphasis, served no 
apparent purpose other than to disparage Basic and intimate its 
vulnerability. 
As he had in Blair, he omitted reference to the PSLRA and the 
SLUSA under circumstances that made his presentation less than 
accurate. That is, using much the same language that he had before, he 
lambasted in terrorem settlements in securities class actions without 
mentioning that such settlements had been targeted by the PSLRA and 
the SLUSA.232 
5. Reaping What You Sow 
Only after the Blair, West, and Szabo opinions were on the books 
did the other circuit courts begin applying Rule 23(f) to fraud-on-the-
market.233 A number of these courts placed obstacles in the path of 
plaintiffs seeking certification, including requiring them to prove loss 
causation,234 materiality,235 and the existence of a primary (rather than 
 
 231 See West, 282 F.3d at 938 (emphasis added). 
 232 Judge Easterbrook’s precise language was as follows: 
[S]ome scholars believe that the settlements in securities cases reflect high 
risk of catastrophic loss, which together with imperfect alignment of 
managers’ and investors’ interests leads defendants to pay substantial sums 
even when the plaintiffs have weak positions. See Janet Cooper Alexander, 
Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, 
When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733 
(1994); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without 
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991). The strength of this effect has 
been debated, see Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV. 438 
(1994), but its existence is established. 
Id. at 937. For the analogous language in Blair, see supra note 205 and accompanying 
text. While the West version contains the addition of Professor Seligman’s law review 
article, it, like the others, was written before the enactment of the PSLRA and the 
SLUSA. 
 233 Prior to West, two circuits applied Rule 23(f) in securities cases where the 
issues did not involve fraud-on-the-market. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001) (focusing on whether the 
plaintiffs had satisfied the predominance requirement in an action alleging the failure 
of brokers to satisfy their duty of best execution); Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 
257 F.3d 475, 477-78 (5th Cir. 2001) (focusing on the adequacy of the class 
representatives in the wake of the PSLRA). 
 234 See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 
(5th Cir. 2007) (requiring proof of loss causation), abrogated by Erica P. John Fund, 
Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
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a secondary) violation.236 Equally important, these courts did not 
inquire into whether these obstacles could be squared with Eisen’s ban 
on merits-driven certification orders.237 While causality is never 
simple, it seems reasonable to suppose that these opinions were fueled 
at least in part by Judge Easterbrook’s denigration of Basic and Eisen 
and his depiction of a securities class action crisis that stood untamed 
by the PSLRA and the SLUSA.238 
IV. JUDGE EASTERBROOK TURNS THE TABLES 
This Part explores Judge Easterbrook’s remarkable change in 
perspective that emerged from his 2010 opinion in Schleicher v. 
Wendt.239 After examining that opinion and seeking to explain the 
seeming shift that it represents, attention turns to Schleicher’s 
influence on the Supreme Court’s engagements with fraud-on-the-
market in Halliburton I,240 Amgen,241 and Halliburton II.242 
 
 235 See, e.g., In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 
2008) (requiring the plaintiffs to prove materiality at the certification stage), abrogated 
by Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); In re 
PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 7 n.11 (1st Cir. 2005) (same), abrogated by 
Amgen, 133 S. Ct. 1184. 
 236 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 
F.3d 372, 386 (5th Cir. 2007) (requiring the plaintiffs to prove the defendant’s 
commission of a primary violation at the certification stage); Gariety v. Grant 
Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2004) (same). 
 237 See cases cited supra notes 234–36. But cf. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 268-70 
(attempting to square Eisen with the imposition of a loss causation prerequisite on the 
ground that the latter served as a double check on the market’s efficiency). The 
Supreme Court thereafter rejected the latter argument as follows: “Loss causation has 
no logical connection to the facts necessary to establish the efficient market predicate 
to the fraud-on-the-market theory.” Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2186. 
 238 See supra notes 196–232 and accompanying text; cf. J. Mark Ramseyer, Not-So-
Ordinary Judges in Ordinary Courts: Teaching Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 1199, 1209 (2007) (examining a majority opinion by Judge Easterbrook and 
the opinion written by Judge Posner in dissent, and reaching the conclusion that “the 
bench . . . is not a place for men and women with the independence and sophistication 
of these two men. Such judges can muddy the law by trying to fix bad precedent, and 
worsen the law by setting interventionist examples for their far less talented peers”). 
 239 Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing a new emphasis 
to securities class action cases). 
 240 Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2184. 
 241 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1197 (2013). 
 242 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2410 (2014). 
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A. Schleicher v. Wendt 
At issue in Schleicher was whether fraud-on-the-market plaintiffs 
must prove loss causation and materiality in order to obtain 
certification.243 The trial court ruled that they did not244 and the 
defendants sought to appeal. A motions panel had granted an 
interlocutory review,245 following which the appeal was referred to a 
merits panel that included then-Chief Judge Easterbrook.246 In his 
opinion affirming the trial court’s ruling, Judge Easterbrook not only 
threw in his lot with fraud-on-the-market and Eisen but also placed 
the PSLRA and the SLUSA at center stage.247 
1. Placing the PSLRA and the SLUSA at Center Stage 
Recall that Judge Easterbrook had previously rationalized his 
antagonism towards securities class actions by invoking the specter of 
in terrorem settlements.248 In discussing those settlements, he made no 
mention of the PSLRA and the SLUSA, thereby implying that the 
settlements persisted unchecked.249 
In Schleicher, on the other hand, he not only acknowledged the 
PSLRA and the SLUSA but explained that a reduction of in terrorem 
settlements was their reason for being: 
Congress has been concerned about the potential for class 
certification to create pressure for settlement . . . .[T]he means 
that Congress chose to deal with settlement pressure were to 
require more at the pleading stage and to ensure that litigation 
occurs in federal court under these special standards, rather 
than state court under looser ones. The pleading requirement 
is one aspect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act . . . 
and the federal-forum rule is part of the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act . . . .250 
Going further, he held that courts were obliged to defer to 
Congress’s solution for in terrorem securities class action settlements 
 
 243 Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 686-87. 
 244 See Schleicher v. Wendt, No. 1:02-cv-1332-DFH-TAB, 2009 WL 761157, at *10 
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 2009). 
 245 See Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 683. 
 246 See id. at 681. 
 247 See infra notes 248–64 and accompanying text. 
 248 See supra notes 205, 232 and accompanying text. 
 249 See supra notes 207–210, 232 and accompanying text. 
 250 Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 686. 
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instead of making their own “further adjustments.”251 Thus, a 
judicially created loss causation prerequisite to certification, he 
concluded, could not be squared with the principle of separation-of-
powers.252 
To be sure, Judge Easterbook did not explain precisely why the 
courts could not act, even if Congress had also. One possibility was 
that, in the course of enacting the PSLRA in particular, Congress had 
decided to leave Basic alone after giving consideration to a legislative 
override.253 
2. Making the Case for Fraud-on-the-Market 
Recall that Judge Easterbrook had previously denigrated fraud-on-
the-market for receiving the support of only four of the six Basic 
Justices254 and had called upon the circuit courts to give it “a look.”255 
Contrast his opinion in Schleicher, where, when referring to Basic, he 
portrayed its teachings as ironclad: “A court of appeals can’t revise 
principles established by the Supreme Court.”256 Moreover, he rejected 
a loss causation prerequisite in part on the ground that Basic did not 
call for it.257 
In addition, in Schleicher, he championed the fraud-on-the-market 
claim from the standpoint of economics, an area of study in which he 
ranks as a luminary.258 He explained that the claim rested on the semi-
strong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, which 
enjoys strong scholarly support and does not require stock prices to 
reflect fundamental value.259 Thus, he continued, the fraud-on-the-
market claim is undermined neither by the existence of inaccurate 
prices260 nor by the presence in the market of long or short sellers: “A 
 
 251 Id. 
 252 See id. 
 253 This was the argument thereafter made by Justice Ginsburg in Amgen Inc. v. 
Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1200-02 (2013), 
discussed infra notes 278–90 and accompanying text. 
 254 See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 255 See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 256 Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 683. 
 257 Id. at 685-86. 
 258 See, e.g., Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1166 (noting that Judge 
Easterbrook was a distinguished academic as well as a leading figure in the “Chicago 
School” of law and economics). 
 259 Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 685; see also supra note 86 (describing the three versions 
of the efficient market hypothesis). 
 260 See Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 685. 
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person buys stock (goes long) because he think the current price too 
low and expects it to rise; a person sells short . . . because he thinks 
the price too high and expects it to fall.”261 
3. Being Faithful to Eisen 
In Eisen, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs cannot be 
required to prove the merits of their case as a condition of 
certification. Prior to Schleicher, Judge Easterbrook undercut Eisen by 
depicting its holding as an open question.262 In addition, he ignored 
Eisen in order to dispose quickly of a frivolous case.263 In Schleicher, 
on the other hand, he embraced Eisen to explain his refusal to 
condition certification on the proof by the plaintiff of loss causation 
and materiality.264 
B. Possible Explanations for the Turnabout 
What accounts for Judge Easterbrook’s change in perspective? A 
number of factors may have been at work. One is that in the more 
than eight years that had elapsed since the publication of his earlier 
opinions,265 he may have become persuaded that the PSLRA and the 
SLUSA represented an effective counterweight to in terrorem 
settlements. Perhaps in part for that reason, moreover, he may have 
been distressed by the obstacles to certification that other circuits had 
imposed.266 
On the other hand, his change in perspective may have been more 
apparent than real, with his previous criticism of fraud-on-the-market 
intended largely as hyperbole aimed at precipitating energetic use of 
Rule 23(f) rather than as an actual call to arms against it.267 On this 
view, when Schleicher presented him with an opportunity to prune 
 
 261 Id. at 684. 
 262 See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 263 See supra notes 227–30 and accompanying text. 
 264 Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 686-88. 
 265 Compare West v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937-38 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(disparaging fraud-on-the-market, implicitly failing to give Eisen its due, and 
neglecting the constraints imposed by the PSLRA and the SLUSA), with the court’s 
decision eight years later in Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d at 683, 686-88 (7th Cir. 
2010) (extoling fraud-on-the-market and Eisen and emphasizing constraints imposed 
by the PSLRA and the SLUSA). 
 266 See supra notes 233–38 and accompanying text. 
 267 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
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fraud-on-the-market back, he offered principled reasons for putting 
the shears away. 
Regardless of which explanation comes closer to the truth, an 
additional consideration likely to have affected the opinion was the 
then-pending certiorari petition in Halliburton I,268 filed after the 
argument in Schleicher269 and still awaiting disposition when the 
opinion in that case was issued.270 The petition urged the Supreme 
Court to resolve a split between two circuits as to whether loss 
causation should serve as a prerequisite to certification in fraud-on-
the-market cases.271 Given the circuit split, which his own opinion 
would soon deepen, Judge Easterbrook could have quite reasonably 
written in anticipation of a Supreme Court audience.272 To package his 
views most attractively for the Court’s consumption, he may have felt 
obliged to defer to its opinions in Basic and Eisen as well as to 
acknowledge the enactments of Congress. 
C. Schleicher in the Supreme Court 
All three of the Supreme Court’s recent fraud-on-the-market 
opinions reflect Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Schleicher to some 
extent. Moreover, the impact of Schleicher appears to have grown with 
each successive opinion. 
1. Halliburton I 
At issue in Halliburton I was whether the plaintiffs must prove loss 
causation as a prerequisite to certification in fraud-on-the-market 
cases.273 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice John Roberts 
 
 268 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. 
(Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (No. 09-1403), 2010 WL 2007735. 
 269 The Halliburton I certiorari petition was filed on May 13, 2010. See id. The argument 
in Schleicher took place on September 22, 2009. See Schleicher, 618 F. 3d at 679. 
 270 The decision date in Schleicher was August 20, 2010. See supra note 265. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Halliburton I on January 7, 2011. See Erica P. 
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011). 
 271 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 268, at 12-32. 
 272 Compare SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 143, § 4.4, at 243 (noting that “[t]he 
Supreme Court often, but not always, will grant certiorari where the decision of a 
federal court of appeals, as to which review is sought, in direct conflict with a decision 
of another court of appeals on the same matter of federal law”), with id. § 4.4(b), at 
247 (noting the especial significance of a split of authority that envelops more than 
two circuits). 
 273 See Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2183. 
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held that they need not do so.274 He cited Judge Easterbrook’s opinion 
in Schleicher only once, in connection with the existence of a circuit 
split,275 but his reasoning suggests that he may have been more 
influenced by it than the one citation might suggest. Indeed, in 
addition to sharing Judge Easterbrook’s view that imposing a loss 
causation prerequisite could not be squared with Basic,276 he displayed 
no inclination to impose such a prerequisite for the purpose of 
curtailing in terrorem settlements, a phenomenon to which he made no 
reference.277 
2. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds 
At issue in Amgen was whether the plaintiffs should have to prove 
materiality as a condition of certification.278 There was a split of 
authority on the question, with the prerequisite supported by several 
circuits279 and opposed by the Seventh Circuit, through Judge 
Easterbrook’s opinion in Schleicher.280 
Whether proof of materiality should serve as a condition of 
certification was more complicated than whether proof of loss 
causation should do so. Unlike loss causation, which received no 
mention in Basic’s discussion of fraud-on-the-market,281 materiality 
 
 274 Id. at 2186. 
 275 See id. at 2184. 
 276 Compare id. at 2186 (observing that a loss causation prerequisite “contravenes 
Basic’s fundamental premise”), with Scheicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685-86 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (invoking Basic as ground for rejecting a loss causation prerequisite). 
 277 There was the possibility at the time that this represented Chief Justice 
Roberts’s unstated acceptance of Judge Easterbrook’s separation of powers argument. 
Later events support the accuracy of that inference. See infra notes 305–06 and 
accompanying text. 
 278 See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013). 
 279 See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 280 See Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 685. 
 281 The Supreme Court’s decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), 
came seven years before the enactment of the PSLRA, which made proof of loss 
causation a statutory requirement in Rule 10b-5 cases. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) 
(2012). The Basic decision might still have mentioned loss causation, however, since a 
number of pre-PSLRA courts had required it to be proved as a matter of federal 
common law. See, e.g., Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 366 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(“To satisfy the causation element, the plaintiffs were required to show ‘some causal 
nexus’ between [defendant’s] conduct and the plaintiffs’ loss.”); Bennett v. U.S. Trust 
Co. of N.Y., 770 F.2d 308, 313 (2d Cir. 1985) (“To establish causation, the plaintiff 
must show ‘both loss causation — that the misrepresentations or omissions caused the 
economic harm — and transaction causation — that the violations in question caused 
the [plaintiff] to engage in the transaction in question.’” (quoting Schlick v. Penn-Dixie 
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received many.282 The question was whether those references involved 
the merits only (rendering materiality irrelevant to certification) or 
encompassed the certification stage as well (indicating the 
opposite).283 The Amgen Court divided 6–3.284 
Writing for the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concluded that 
Basic’s materiality references pertained exclusively to the merits, a 
conclusion which, she noted, comported with the one reached in 
Schleicher.285 But she did not leave matters there. Adopting Judge 
Easterbrook’s separation-of-powers argument and quoting his 
phraseology, she held that “[w]e do not think it appropriate for the 
judiciary to make its own further adjustments by reinterpreting Rule 
23 to make likely success on the merits essential to class certification 
in securities-fraud suits.”286 Moreover, going a step beyond Judge 
Easterbrook, she made explicit why judicial responses could not 
supplement the legislative ones: When enacting the PSLRA, Congress 
immunized Basic from judicial whittling by deciding to leave it intact 
after contemplating its override.287 
A word is in order about Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence. 
Claiming that the efficient capital markets hypothesis had lost the 
support of economists, he invited challenges to fraud-on-the-market 
on this basis.288 Especially given the antipathy to the hypothesis 
expressed by Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent, in which Justices 
 
Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974))); Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 
750 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring plaintiffs to prove both transaction 
causation and loss causation). 
 282 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 (noting that “[r]ecent empirical studies have tended 
to confirm Congress’ premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed 
markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material 
misrepresentations”); id. at 247 (noting that “nearly every court that has considered 
the proposition has concluded that where materially misleading statements have been 
disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of 
individual plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be presumed”); id. 
(noting that “[b]ecause most publicly available information is reflected in market 
price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations may be 
presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action”); id. at 248 n.27 (indicating that the 
circuit court had conditioned the presumption on the plaintiffs’ proof of materiality). 
 283 See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1195. 
 284 Joining Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion were Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Alito. Id. at 1190. Justice Alito also wrote a 
separate concurrence, discussed infra note 288 and accompanying text. Dissenting 
were Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1190. 
 285 See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1197 (citing Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 687). 
 286 Id. at 1201 (quoting Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 686). 
 287 See id. 
 288 See id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia joined,289 court observers 
speculated that the Court might soon agree to consider whether fraud-
on-the-market should remain in place.290 
3. Halliburton II 
That speculation proved prescient. After the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Halliburton I, the case returned to the trial court, which 
granted certification while declining to consider the defendants’ 
evidence concerning the fraud’s lack of impact on the security’s 
price.291 On appeal of that order, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.292 In a 
petition for certiorari, the defendants renewed their arguments about 
price impact and also posed the question invited by Justice Alito in his 
concurrence in Amgen — whether the fraud-on-the-market claim 
should be modified, if not eliminated, due to the putatively diminished 
status of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.293 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on November 15, 2013,294 and argument was 
heard on March 5, 2014.295 
In his anti-climactic opinion for the Court on June 23, 2014, Chief 
Justice Roberts dashed the hopes of securities class action opponents 
by giving Basic and fraud-on-the-market a decisive endorsement.296 He 
likewise declined to condition certification on the plaintiffs’ proof of 
price impact.297 To be sure, he upheld the defendants’ right to prove a 
lack of price impact at the certification stage.298 But the extent to 
which this right will operate as a boon for the defendants remains 
unclear.299 
 
 289 See id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 290 See, e.g., Steven Kaufhold, Opinion Analysis: Plaintiffs Need Not Establish 
Materiality to Obtain Certification of Securities Class Actions, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 1, 
2013, 6:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/opinion-analysis-plaintiffs-need-
not-establish-materiality-to-obtain-certification-of-securities-class-actions (noting that 
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Amgen, combined with Justice Thomas’s dissent, 
“provides a preview of a potentially much more significant battle to come”). 
 291 See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 292 See id. at 426. 
 293 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11-32, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317), 2013 WL 4855972. 
 294 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013).  
 295 Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2398. 
 296 See id. at 2408-13.  
 297 See id. at 2413-14.  
 298 See id. at 2414-17.  
 299 See, e.g., James D. Cox, The Mist of Halliburton II, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 30, 
2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/06/30/the-mist-of-halliburton-ii/ (noting 
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The bulk of the Chief Justice’s endorsement of the fraud-on-the-
market claim came directly or indirectly from Judge Easterbrook. One 
major critique of the claim involved the prevalence of inaccurate 
prices in ostensibly “efficient markets.”300 To rebut that criticism, 
Roberts quoted Easterbrook, enhancing the authority of the quotation 
by invoking Easterbrook’s name: 
“That the . . . price [of a stock] may be inaccurate does not 
detract from the fact that false statements affect it, and cause 
loss,” which is “all that Basic requires.” Schleicher v. Wendt, 
618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (Easterbrook, C.J.).301 
Another major critique was that so-called “value investors,” also 
known as long or short sellers, put no stock in the existence of 
efficient markets and instead proceed on the basis of the inaccuracy of 
the present price.302 To refute this criticism, Chief Justice Roberts 
drew again upon Judge Easterbrook, querying, “how else could the 
market correction on which his profit depends occur?”303 This query 
puts in question form the answer supplied by Judge Easterbrook in 
Schleicher in response to the same criticism.304 
Consider also the significance that Chief Justice Roberts attached to 
the enactment of the PSLRA and the SLUSA. Borrowing the same page 
from Easterbrook’s book that Justice Ginsburg had borrowed 
previously,305 he depicted these statutes as Congress’s response to in 
 
that Halliburton II is limited to cases of securities traded in an ‘efficient market’ yet 
provides no guidance on what constitutes an efficient market, thus leaving its 
application uncertain); Merritt B. Fox, Halliburton II: Who Won and Who Lost All 
Depends on What Defendants Need to Show to Establish No Impact on Price, CLS BLUE SKY 
BLOG (June 30, 2014) http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/06/30/halliburton-ii-who-
won-and-who-lost-all-depends-on-what-defendants-need-to-show-to-establish-no-impact-
on-price/ (“Whether [the] Supreme Court decision in [Halliburton II] was a victory for 
plaintiffs or for defendants remains to be seen.”). 
 300 Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2410. 
 301 Id.; cf. Choi & Gulati, An Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 58-59 (noting that 
mentioning the name of the author of the opinion offers further credibility for the 
proposition for which the judge is cited). 
 302 Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2410-11. 
 303 Id. at 2411. 
 304 See Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that “[a] 
person buys stock (goes long) because he thinks the current price too low and expects it 
to rise; a person sells short (sells today and promises to cover in the market and deliver 
the shares in the future) because he thinks the price too high and expects it to fall”). 
 305 See supra note 286 and accompanying text. 
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terrorem settlements, a response to which the courts should defer 
rather than seek to complement.306 
V. JUDICIAL SUPERSTARS AND THEIR STRATEGIES 
This Part takes a closer look at the strategies that Judges 
Easterbrook and Posner appear to have employed. All of these 
strategies open up broad new avenues for exploring the behavior of 
the superstar judges. 
A. A Strategy for Moving the Law — Portraying Precedent With Less 
than Full Accuracy 
As earlier Parts of this Article have shown, Judges Easterbrook and 
Posner sometimes enhanced their arguments by ignoring precedent.307 
Recall, for example, that to explain his reversal of a grant of 
certification, Judge Posner cited the weakness of the plaintiffs’ 
substantive case.308 That rationale disregards Eisen,309 which read Rule 
23 to prohibit the merits from driving the certification decision.310 
Judge Posner appears to have taken this path as a way to signal the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules that it should consider amending 
Rule 23 to allow the merits to be considered.311 Recall also that Judge 
Easterbrook likewise on two occasions gave Eisen short shrift.312 Recall 
finally that Judge Easterbrook, once with Judge Posner on the panel 
and once without, failed to mention the PSLRA and the SLUSA when 
discussing the problem of in terrorem settlements in securities class 
actions.313 In so doing, he made the problem appear worse than it was 
and the need for judicial intervention seem greater than it was.314 
There is evidence that these few examples do not stand alone. 
Consider the results of a Westlaw search for reported signed Seventh 
Circuit majority opinions since 1982, which, in the view of a dissent 
or concurrence, misstated precedent.315 There have been fifty-seven 
 
 306 Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2413. 
 307 See supra Parts II, IV.  
 308 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 309 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). 
 310 See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. 
 311 See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
 312 See supra notes 214–16, 227–29. 
 313 See supra notes 207–10, 232 and accompanying text. 
 314 See supra notes 207–10, 232 and accompanying text. 
 315 The approach taken was to find dissents or concurrences that included the 
word “precedent” and then to eliminate those that used it for reasons other than to 
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such majority opinions, twenty-nine of them written by Judge 
Easterbrook or Judge Posner, with twenty-eight authored by all the 
other Seventh Circuit judges combined. The data are set forth in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Authors of Majority Opinions Charged By Dissents or 
Concurrences with Misstating Precedent, 1982–Present 
Bauer 1 Evans 2 Manion 3 Tinder 0 
Coffey 4 Fairchild 1 Posner 15 Williams 2 
Cuddahy 3 Flaum 3 Ripple 0 Wood, Jr. 3 
Cummings 1 Hamilton 1 Rovner 1 Wood 0 
Easterbrook 14 Kanne 3 Sykes 0  
 
There are several possible explanations for the data. First, perhaps 
some of the other judges initially drafted majority opinions containing 
incomplete statements of precedent but thereafter corrected them 
before publication after a fellow panel member flagged the problem 
informally. Those judges might reasonably fear that leaving the 
misstatements in the opinions would trigger questions about their 
competency. In contrast, Judges Easterbrook and Posner might regard 
themselves as insulated from competency questions and thus be more 
inclined to disregard a colleague’s criticisms.316 
Another possible explanation is that the purported misstatements by 
Judges Easterbrook and Posner arose in opinions in which they sought 
to change the law. If so, at least some of the objections to the 
misstatements may have been proxies for objections to the changes 
themselves. 
Majority opinions that portray precedent incompletely are 
worrisome because of their capacity to mislead. That worrisomeness 
does not disappear when another panel member writes separately to 
flag the incompleteness, since the separate opinion may not receive 
 
criticize the accuracy of the majority opinion’s depiction of it. Majority opinions 
written by federal district court judges sitting by designation were excluded. The year 
1982 was the starting point because Judge Posner took the oath of office on December 
4, 1981. See supra note 52. 
 316 The data raise a host of fascinating questions about who is willing to challenge 
the superstar judges. Do they tend to be repeat players or do they instead represent a 
broad cross-section of the court? Moreover, cross-section or not in other respects, to 
what extent (if at all) do the challengers skew senior, white, and male? Finally, what, 
if any, generalizations can be made about the third panel member who does not join 
the dissent or concurrence? 
  
1256 University of California, Davis [Vol. 48:1207 
the attention that it deserves. Moreover, there may not be a separate 
opinion in the first place. Indeed, no one wrote separately to object to 
Judge Easterbrook’s diminishments of Eisen or his failure to mention 
the PSLRA and the SLUSA when discussing the problem of in terrorem 
securities class action settlements.317 These misstatements appear to 
have fueled the willingness of other circuits not only to erect obstacles 
to certification in fraud-on-the-market cases but in addition to do so in 
a manner that failed to take Eisen into account.318 
B. Strategies for Acquiring Opportunities to Change the Law 
1. Retaining an Appeal After Granting the Petition to Appeal 
As Part III of this Article has shown, motions panels over which 
Judges Easterbrook and Posner presided sometimes granted Rule 23(f) 
petitions to appeal and then retained the appeals for decision instead 
of surrendering them for reassignment.319 The effect was to greatly 
increase the number of Rule 23(f) opinions that each of them was 
eligible to write.320 
Judges Easterbrook and Posner typically presented an efficiency 
rationale for reaching the merits — namely, that the briefs filed in 
connection with the petition were comprehensive enough to allow the 
panel to dispose of the appeal without further delay.321 While plausible 
as far as it goes, this rationale fails to take account of the arguable 
appearance of impropriety that the retention creates. Indeed, when 
deciding to grant a petition, the motions panel may develop a view 
about how the appeal should be resolved. Retaining the appeal for 
 
 317 See supra notes 196–232 and accompanying text. 
 318 See supra notes 234–37 and accompanying text. 
 319 See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text. 
 320 See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text. 
 321 See Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 951 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 2004); Allen v. Int’l 
Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 470 (7th Cir. 2004); West v. Prudential Sec., 
Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937-38 (7th Cir. 2002); Isaacs v. Sprint Corp., 261 F.3d 679, 681 
(7th Cir. 2001); Jefferson v. Ingersoll, Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 1999); see also In re 
Household Int’l Tax Reduction Plan, 441 F.3d 500, 501 (7th Cir. 2006) (lacking 
indication of precise reasoning for retaining the appeal); In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 
F.3d 505, 506 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 
910 (7th Cir. 2003) (same); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (same). 
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decision enables the motions panel to make that resolution the law of 
the circuit.322 
To put the matter differently, a motions panel that selects itself as 
the merits panel engages in a species of non-random panel selection, 
efficiency considerations to the contrary notwithstanding. While there 
is no federal statute affirmatively mandating panel randomization,323 
all the circuits select panels on this basis324 and the law review 
literature portrays the practice of randomized panels as deeply 
entrenched and widely assumed.325 
2. Cornering the Market on the Authorship of Certain Opinions 
As Part III of this Article has shown, Judges Easterbrook and Posner 
used their discretion as presiding judges to assign themselves or each 
other the initial Rule 23(f) opinions.326 The worrisome feature of this 
concentration, on which I take no position, is that they may have 
acquired more power to shape the law of Rule 23(f) — or class action 
law in general — than any two judges should have had. 
 
 322 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 323 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 137 (2012) (noting that “[t]he business of a court having more 
than one judge shall be divided among the judges as provided by the rules and orders 
of the court”). 
 324 See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at 
the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1069-78 (2000); see also Andreas 
Broscheid, Comparing Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts of Appeals More Liberal or 
Conservative than Others?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 171, 179 (2011) (noting practice of 
randomly selected panels across the circuits); Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, 
Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals 17-26 
(Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Paper No. 2015-1, 2014), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2520980 (examining whether panel assignments are 
random and discovering evidence to the contrary). 
 325 See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating Preferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of 
Consensus Voting, 54 J.L. & ECON. 781, 792 (2011) (“An important feature of the data, 
consistent with a central assumption of the model, is that cases are randomly assigned 
to panels.”); Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 291, 291 (2000) (“Federal appellate courts employ a random assignment 
system to select the circuit judges who will serve on any particular three-judge 
panel.”); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving 
American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 216-17 (1999) (noting that random 
assignment of cases to panels “has become a ‘hallmark’ of the system”). 
 326 One of the opinions was assigned to Judge Easterbrook by Judge Coffey, the 
presiding judge of the panel. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Moreover, 
Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner each also wrote a Rule 23(f) opinion in 
connection with litigation as to which they had previously written an opinion. See 
supra notes 172–73. 
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The traditional view has been that circuit judges are generalists and 
that opinion assignments should proceed in accordance with that 
norm.327 Recently some scholars have argued on efficiency grounds 
that the generalist norm should give way when a panel member 
possesses special expertise in the subject area at hand, say tax or 
antitrust.328 But unlike the vast and complex tax and antitrust fields, 
Rule 23(f) is not a subject area where special expertise is germane. It is 
a single, circumscribed procedural rule that any competent judge 
should be able to interpret and apply.329 
Substantial scrutiny has been devoted to the significance of the 
opinion assignments of the late Chief Justice Warren Burger — both 
the opinions he retained for himself as well as those that he gave to 
others.330 Attention to the assignment practices of the superstar judges 
can not only shed light on judicial behavior but also help to explain 
why legal doctrine has evolved as it has.331 
3. Operating as a Team 
As Parts III and IV of this Article have shown, Judges Easterbrook 
and Posner appear to have operated as something of a team when it 
came to Rule 23(f).332 In addition to assigning Rule 23(f) opinions 
 
 327 See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 1667, 1667 (2009) (noting that “Americans typically think of judges as 
generalists” and considering the implications of growing judicial specialization); 
Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 520-22 
(2008) (noting the traditional preference for generalist judges). 
 328 See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 327, at 561 (concluding that opinion specialization 
on the federal circuit courts “is a desirable practice worthy of praise and further 
consideration”); see also Baum, supra note 327, at 1676-78 (discussing the efficiency 
argument). 
 329 For commentary on Rule 23(f), see supra note 159. 
 330 See, e.g., Timothy Johnson et al., Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 349, 351 (2005) (noting Chief Justice Burger’s 
conference voting strategies while on the Supreme Court); Wahlbeck, supra note 12, 
at 1730 (discussing Justice William O. Douglas’s objection to the assignment by Chief 
Justice Burger of the opinion in Roe v. Wade to Justice Harry Blackmun); Philip Craig 
Zane, An Interpretation of the Jurisprudence of Chief Justice Warren Burger, 1995 UTAH 
L. REV. 975, 979-80 (discussing different interpretations of Chief Justice Burger’s 
voting and numerous concurring opinions). 
 331 Cf. Baum, supra note 327, at 1681-83 (calling for research into the impact of 
judicial specialization). 
 332 In other contexts they were not invariably in agreement. Cf. M. Todd 
Henderson, Deconstructing Duff and Phelps, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2007) 
(documenting dissents by Judge Easterbrook from opinions by Judge Posner and vice 
versa). 
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only to themselves and each other,333 they each authored combination 
opinions,334 a practice that was not the norm in other circuits.335 
In studying the superstar judges, the possibility of an alliance, be it 
time-specific or long-standing, circumscribed by subject-area or 
otherwise, should be borne firmly in mind. Other individuals, on or 
off the bench, may have aided and abetted their achievements. The 
history of the judiciary is studded with well-known partnerships, 
including those between Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood 
Marshall336 as well as among the anti-New Deal Justices known as the 
“Four Horsemen.”337 There were also alliances, respectively, between 
the renowned Second Circuit Judge Henry J. Friendly and Harvard 
Law School Professor Louis Loss338 and between Judges Friendly and 
Posner.339 
CONCLUSION 
Understanding the evolution of fraud-on-the-market requires taking 
account of the outsized contributions of Judges Easterbrook and 
Posner. Moreover, their contributions can be understood only by 
considering the strategies that these two esteemed jurists employed to 
 
 333 See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 334 For the definition of this term, see supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 335 See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 336 See JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 260 (1994) (describing 
the extent to which Justice Marshall voted the same way as Justice Brennan did and 
referring to the two of them as “almost a hyphenated entity”). 
 337 Supreme Court Justices Pierce Butler, James C. McReynolds, George 
Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter are considered the “Four Horsemen” and are 
known for their conservative views. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the 
Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559 (1997) (arguing that the “Four Horsemen” were 
actually “closet liberals,” contrary to the narrative of the traditional scholarship on 
these judges); Samuel R. Olken, Justice Sutherland Reconsidered, 62 VAND. L. REV. 639, 
642-43 (2009) (reinterpreting the personal beliefs undergirding Justice Sutherland’s 
jurisprudence on economic liberty). 
There was also an initial alignment between the late Chief Justice Warren Burger 
and Associate Justice Harry Blackmun, who were sometimes referred to as “the 
Minnesota Twins.” See Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger 
Court, 11 HAMLINE L. REV. 183, 196-98 (1988) (describing the initial Burger-Blackmun 
alignment and the reasons for its subsequent disintegration). 
 338 See Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The 
Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777, 794-808 (1997). 
 339 See William Domnarski, The Correspondence of Henry Friendly and Richard A. 
Posner 1982–86, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 395, 399-400 (2011) (discussing the 
relationship and communication between Judge Friendly and Judge Posner through 
the lens of their letters). 
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bring them to life. This Article has identified some of those strategies 
and has endeavored to provide a larger context for evaluating them. 
Legal academics appear to be more comfortable contemplating the 
strategies that operate on the Supreme Court level than on the federal 
circuit court level.340 We need to overcome our hesitancy about the 
latter. Not only will our familiarity with those strategies deepen our 
insights about when and why the law changes. Equally important, it 
will enable us to better understand the superstar judges, major 
architects of legal doctrine. 
 
 340 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
